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Ernest A. Young *
This chapter, to be included in the Oxford Principles of EU Law volume,
compares the federalisms of Europe and the United States. It argues that Europe
can be sensibly viewed from both federal and intergovernmental perspectives, and
that particular aspects of the European Union’s structure fit each model. In
particular, the EU is federal—that is, integrated to a comparable degree to the
U.S.—with respect to its distribution of competences and the sovereignty
attributed to EU law and institutions. But it is intergovernmental —that is, it
preserves a center of gravity within the individual member states—with respect to
the allocation of governmental capacity to enforce the law as well as to tax and
spend, and also because Europeans continue to identify primarily with their
member states.
The chapter also addresses two sets of questions about the EU’s future.
One concerns the possibility of “creeping centralization” that one observes in the
United States, and which one might also detect in the EU’s slogan of “ever closer
union.” I argue that any such tendency will be limited by the fact that the modern
regulatory and welfare bureaucracies that have spurred centralization in the
America instead developed at the member state level in Europe, prior to the
advent of the EU. I also consider the impact of exogenous shocks, especially the
euro crisis but also parallel crises over migration and terrorism. The response to
these crises so far seems to have strengthened the EU’s intergovernmental
tendencies.
Comparing Europe and the United States can provide helpful insights about
both systems-and federal systems in general. As is often true, the primary value of
comparative law here is in the questions it raises, not the answers it may provide.
Many aspects of federalism taken for granted in one system are considered
nonobvious or even controversial in the other, and an appreciation of this fact can
enrich federalism debates on both sides of the Atlantic.
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It is easy to be of two minds about Europe. From one perspective, the
European Union enjoys an impressive array of legislative powers, and initiatives
from the center account for a large and apparently increasing proportion of
legislation within each Member State. Past efforts to contain the growth of the
EU’s authority—such as the principles of conferral and subsidiarity—have been
disappointments. If the EU is in fact becoming a federal super-state, then two
imperatives logically arise. Those who welcome this “ever closer union”
nonetheless worry that it is insufficiently democratic and transparent, and that it
lacks a public that identifies as European to hold it to account. 1 And those who do
not wish to be part of a European federal super-state start looking for limiting
principles—or for the exits. 2
A different perspective emphasizes the EU’s institutional, functi onal, and
political weaknesses. Despite the broad scope of its legislative mandate, the EU
generally lacks authority or capacity to administer its laws directly; it employs a
workforce equivalent to that of a city, not a continental economic superpower. It
has minimal powers to tax and spend. And public opinion research makes clear
that the vast majority of Europeans continue to primarily identify with their nation
states—not the Union. These institutional and political realities have remained
largely stable over time, despite round after round of treaty amendments and
expansion of the EU to take in dozens of new members. From this perspective, the
EU is the most successful international organization in human history, but it is a
mistake to compare it to federal nation-states like the United States. 3
1

See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis, Social Europe J.,
July 5, 2013, available at http://www.social-europe.eu/2013/05/democracy-solidarity-and-theeuropean-crisis-2/.
2

See, e.g., David Cameron, Speech on the European Union, Gov.UK, Jan. 23, 2013, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg.
3

See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Europe Without Illusions, in Andrew Moravcsik, ed., Europe
Without Illusions: The Paul-Henri Spaak Lectures, 1994-1999 3, 8 (2005).
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In part, these two perspectives reflect basic institutional compromises in the
EU’s architecture. At least since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU treaties have
provided for “supranational” decisionmaking, along the lines of a federal state, in
some areas such as the single market, with intergovernmental structures
guaranteeing a veto or opt-out for individual member states in other areas, more
closely tied to national sovereignty. 4 The introduction of the Euro brought with it
two additional compromises between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.
European Monetary Union (EMU) created supranational institutions to handle
monetary policy, but the Member States retained sovereign control over fiscal
policy, with disagreements to be worked out politically on an intergovernmental
basis. And the EU’s embrace of “variable architecture” allowed some nations —
notably, the United Kingdom and Denmark—not to participate in EMU at all. 5
These two perspectives—federal and integovernmental—each have both a
descriptive and a normative dimension.
Each offers a lens for simply
understanding what is happening in Europe. In this vein, each perspective focuses
on different elements of the European legal and political order, and each points us
toward a different set of comparators and evaluative criteria. Each perspective
also, however, represents normative aspirations for Europe. As Alberto Alesina
and Roberto Perotti have observed, “an unresolved tension between those who
would like the European Union to evolve into a super national entity (the
federalists or super nationalists) and those who would like it to stay a union of
independent governments (the intergovernmentalists) has shaped much of the
history of European institutions.” 6
The debate, moreover, is not simply academic. The “Convention on the
Future of Europe,” which set out twelve years ago to draft a constitutional treaty,
was at least partially driven by the idea that Europe was becoming a federal state. 7
Although the resulting constitutional treaty failed, the Member States adopted its
institutional core—somewhat more quietly—in the Treaty of Lisbon. On the other
hand, the German Constitutional Court accepted the legality of the Lisbon Treaty
only because it concluded that the EU remained an essentially intergovernmental
4

See generally Sergio Fabbrini, The Euro Crisis and Its Constitutional Implications, in Serge
Champeau, Carlos Closa, Daniel Innerarity, & Miguel Poaires Maduro, eds., The Future of
Europe: Democracy, Legitimacy and Justice after the Euro Crisis, 19, 20-21 (2015) (discussing
the Maastricht Treaty’s compromise between intergover nmentalism and supranationalism in
different policy areas).
5

See id. at 22-26.

6

Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View, 18 J.
Econ. Perspectives 27, 27 (Fall 2004).
7

See Russell Miller, Germany vs. Europe: The Principle of Democracy in German Constitutional
Law and the Struggle for European Integration, Washington & Lee Public Legal Studies
Research Paper Series No. 2013-14, Aug. 13, 2013, at 3 n. 9 (noting that “[a] European federal
state was the undeniable ambition of the advocates for a European constitution”). But see Joseph
Weiler, Editorial: Marking the Anniversary of the Universal Declaration; The Irish No and the
Lisbon Treaty, EJIL: Talk!, Dec. 9, 2008, available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/letters-to-theeditor-respond-to-ejil-editorials-vol-194/ (arguing that what the Convention actually produced
was merely “a Reform Treaty adapting the European Union to enlargement ”).
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entity; 8 as the Court put it, “the Treaty of Lisbon decided against the concept of a
European federal state.” 9 How one thinks of the EU thus has important
consequences for its current legality and imperatives for reform.
Europe’s responses to a series of recent crises are likely to put pressure on
its present uneasy compromise between federalism and intergovernmentalism.
Responses to the Euro crisis have taken the form of agreements among the Euro
countries, operating outside the ordinary EU lawmaking process, and they have
sanctioned an unpecedented intrusion into the Member States’ fiscal affairs. 10
Even as the governments of the Euro nations draw closer together pursuant to
these agreements, backlashes against austerity in the more financially-troubled
Member States threaten the Euro area’s unity. 11 That unity is also under threat
from Europe’s most massive migration crisis since the Second World War. The
sheer size of the migrant wave put significant pressure on the Member St ates’
ability to agree on how many immigrants each should absorb, and the pressure has
increased signficantly as the migration issue became linked to fears of terrorism in
the wake of the Paris attacks in November of 2015. 12
The juxtaposition of the federalist and intergovernmental perspectives on
Europe can tell us something about how federal systems work—both in their
incremental evolution over time and in their response to crisis. In America,
constitutional debate tends to focus on the scope of national legislative power. In
the recent litigation over President Obama’s sweeping national healthcare reform,
the issue that drew most of the attention was whether Congress’s power to regulate
commerce among the several states extended to a requirement that all individuals
purchase health insurance. 13 Yet Americans probably focus on the scope of
national regulatory jurisdiction because we take for granted the national
government’s institutional authority and capacity to tax, spend, and enforce
national law. Europe gives us a window on the relative importance of these
8

Lisbon Treaty Case, 123 BVerfG 267 (2009); EFSF Case, 129 BVerfGE 124 (2011) , available at
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html .
9

Id. at 370-71.

10

See generally Federico Fabbrini, Economic Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes,
Constitutional Challenges (forthcoming 2016).
11

See, e.g., Barry Hatton, Portuguese Lawmakers Force Government to Resign by Rejecting Its
Austerity Policies, U.S. News & World Report, Nov. 10, 2015, available at
http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015/11/10/portugal -braces-for-fall-of-govt-amidausterity-backlash; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Greek Deal Poisons Europe as Backlash Mounts
Against ‘Neo Colonial Servitude’, The Telegraph, July 13, 2015, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11737388/Greek -deal-poisons-Europe-asbacklash-mounts-against-neo-colonial-servitude.html.
12

See, e.g., Holly Ellyat, After Paris Attacks, Is there a EU Backlash Against Migrants? , CNBC,
Nov. 27, 2015, available at http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/27/paris-attacks-turn-eu-leadersagainst-migrants.html; After Paris, Drawbridges Up?, The Economist, Nov. 21, 2015, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21678832 -schengen-system-open-borders-was-alreadyunder-pressure-latest-terrorist-attacks-may.
13

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

4

capacities, and that may in turn encourage American judges and scholars to
refocus on under-appreciated limits on those capacities in the U.S. system.
Likewise, European debates about national and European identity ought to
remind Americans of identity’s central role in multi-level systems. In Europe,
Member State identities remain both primary and powerful, 14 and they may impose
significant constraints on certain sorts of EU-level policies—especially those that
call on citizens of some Member States to make economic sacrifices on behalf of
others. 15 Most scholars of American federalism, on the other hand, assume that no
meaningful state-level attachments exist in this country. 16 This, of course, is an
assumption about an empirical fact, and it may well be incorrect. 17 But Europe’s
debates about identity can illumine both the ways that empirical question might be
answered and the consequences of that answer for the federal balance.
Comparisons are always difficult, of course, and the European Union
remains terra incognita to most American legal scholars. That is understandable,
perhaps—the domestic literature, particularly in constitutional law, is vast enough,
and the EU regime is both intimidatingly complex and seemingly in constant
flux. 18 This is particularly true on the structural side of constitutional law. As one
of our finest comparative constitutionalists observed some years ago, a federal
structure “typically constitutes an interrelated ‘package of arrangements. No one
element of the package can be compared to a similar-seeming element in a
different federal system without more broadly considering the comparability of the
whole ‘package’ and the role of the particular element within that f ederal
package.” 19 This makes it hard to feel like one understands anything without

14

See, e.g., Neil Fligstein, Euro-Clash: the EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe 4
(2008); Peter J. Katzenstein & Jeffrey T. Checkel, Conclusion—European Identity in Context, in
Jeffrey T. Checkel & Peter J. Katzenstein, eds., European Identity 213, 215 (2009) (“The number
of unambiguously committed Europeans (10-15% of the total population) is simply too small for
the emergence of a strong cultural European sense of belonging.”).
15

See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, EU: Closing the Community Deficit, 43 Intereconomics 324, 327
(2008).
16

See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward Rubin, Federalism: National Identity and Tragic
Compromise 115-23 (2008); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection
of Fundamental Rights 27 (2009).
17

See Ernest A. Young, What Does It Take to Make a Federal System? On Constitutional
Entrenchment, Separate Spheres, and Identity, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 831, 841-42 (2010) (book
review).
18

The institutional architecture of the EU has, for example, changed significantly in the fourteen
years since my last effort to compare European and American federalism. See Ernest A. Young,
Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from
American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1612 (2002).
19

Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional
Experience, 51 Duke L.J. 223, 273-74 (2001).
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understanding everything. American scholars’ focus on their own country is not
so much arrogance (as others often assume) but the better part of valor. 20
To the complexity of current comparisons we must also add the element of
time. American scholars who care about federalism confront a history of the
relentless expansion of national power. Assessing whether a similar future awaits
the EU, however, requires consideration of the centralization dynamic in relation
to other historical arcs. The growth of national power in America occurred in
tandem with the development of the modern regulatory and welfare state. Indeed,
one way to tell that story is that the tardy growth of modern governance at the
state level opened the door for those institutions to flower at the national level. 21
In Europe, by contrast, the regulatory welfare state developed and is firmly
entrenched within each Member State, and any effort to shift those co re
responsibilities to Brussels would likely confront the same inertial forces that, in
America, impede devolution of national authority to the states.
The element of time, however, requires attention not only to long-term
historical processes but also to shocks and crises that may destabilize existing
arrangements. American federalism, after all, has been profoundly shaped by
crises like the Civil War and the Great Depression. Similarly, Europe’s present
equilibrium is already under pressure from the “Great Recession” of the last few
years and the accompanying debt and banking crises in Greece, Portugal, Ireland,
and other EU Member States. 22 These pressures have been compounded, even
more recently, by a migration crisis involving unprecedented refugee flo ws from
the Middle East and a renewal of terrorist attacks on European soil. Each of these
crises has exacerbated the tensions between federalism and intergovernmentalism
in EU governance.
This essay focuses on comparisons between America and Europe with
respect to questions of constitutional structure. 23 I begin, in Part I, with the two
contradictory perspectives on the EU’s federal balance that I have already
mentioned. I discuss the variables affecting the degree of actual centralization in
Europe and what those variables can tell us about federalism in the United States.
Part II tries to put those variables in comparative historical context. I suggest that
the late advent of the EU, relative to the development of modern governance in the
Member States, may dampen the inherent trend toward centralization that we seem
to see in American federalism. On the other hand, I consider the possibility that
crisis may nonetheless create strong pressures for further centralization in Europe.
20

I thus write with an eye to American readers as well as Europeans, with apologies where that
requires telling the latter group things that they already know.
21

See, e.g., David Brian Robertson, Federalism and the Making of America 112-16 (2012)
(describing the origins in the New Deal in the failure of state governments to stem the tide of the
Depression).
22

See, e.g., Jean Pisani-Ferry, The Euro Crisis and its Aftermath (2014); Johan Van Overtveldt,
The End of the Euro: The Uneasy Future of the European Union (2011).
23

These are not, of course, the only comparisons to be made; the choice is dictated, instead, by
the limits of the present author’s plausible claims to expertise.
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I.

Two Europes

There has always been a debate about whether Europe should be regarded
as a federal system. On one level, the answer is obvious: The EU generally falls
within standard definitions of “federalism” in constitutional and political theory. 24
Political scientist Jenna Bednar, for example, classifies a government as federal if
it meets structural criteria of “geopolitical division” (mutually exclusive territories
are constitutionally recognized and may not be abolished by the central authority);
“independence” (state and national governments have electorally or otherwise
independent bases of authority); and “direct governance” (each level of
government governs its citizens directly and is constitutionally sovereign in at
least one policy realm). 25 The EU meets these criteria. It is geopolitically
divided; the European Parliament is separately elected from the Member State
governments, and members of the Commission, once appointed, are insulated from
the Member States’ direct control; 26 and both the EU and the Member States
possess areas of exclusive authority under the current allocation of competences. 27
And although the EU lacks a formal “constitution,” its allocation of authority is
nonetheless entrenched in the sense that can be changed only unanimous consent
of the Member States in a new treaty. 28

24

See, e.g., 5 Oxford English Dictionary 795 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “federal” as “that form of
government in which two or more states constitute a political unity while remaining more or less
independent with regard to their internal affairs”); Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism:
Theory and Practice 2 (2006) (defining a “federation” as an “organisational form” that
“accommodat[es] the constituent units of a union in the decision -making procedure of the central
government by means of constitutional entrenchment”); Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism
12 (1987) (“The simplest possible definition is self-rule plus shared rule. Federalism thus
defined involves some kind of contractual linkage of a presumably permanent character that (1)
provides for power sharing, (2) cuts around the issue of sovereignty, and (3) supplements but
does not seek to replace or diminish prior organic ties where they exist.”).
25

Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design 18-19 (2009). Professor Bednar’s
definition is similar to William Riker’s. See William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation,
Significance 11 (1964) (holding that a system is federal if (1) it involves “[t]wo levels of
government ruling over the same land and people; (2) “each level [has] at le ast one area of action
in which it is autonomous”; and (3) “[t]here is some guarantee of the autonomy of each
government in its own sphere”).
26

See EC Treaty art. 213 (requiring that members of the Commission be “completely independent
in the performance of their duties” ).
27

See also David McKay, Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal Experience
8-22 (2001) (concluding that the EU may usefully be analyzed as a federal system); R. Daniel
Kelemen, Built to Last? The Durability of EU Federalism, in Sophie Meunier & Kathleen R.
McNamara, eds., Making History: European Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty , 51, 52
(2007) (noting widespread scholarly agreement on this point).
28

See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. R EV . 903 (1994) (defining “federalism”—in opposition to mere
“decentralization”—as a decentralized institutional arrangement that cannot be altered by the
central authority, where the subunits have rights t hat function as ‘trumps’ against central
power”); Andrew Moravcsik, The European Constitutional Settlement, in Meunier & McNamara,
supra note 27, at 23, 34 (stressing the formal difficulty of changes to the European treaties).

7

To say this, though, is simply to kick the hard questions down the road.
The standard definitions, after all, are quite open-ended. Carl Friedrich, for
example, defined federalism as “a union of groups, united by one or more common
objective, but retaining their distinctive group character for other purposes.” 29 By
this definition, the EU is a federal system—but so are NATO and the WTO.
Hence, Michael Burgess is right to warn that “[i]f we are to understand the
contemporary EU as a federal model, it is vital that we are sensitised to the
peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of European integration.” 30 And one must also
recognize that other analytical models—for example, international organizations 31
or administrative agencies 32—may also have significant analytical power in
describing the relationship between the EU and its Member States.
Hence the two perspectives with which I began. I am going to call the first
the “federal” perspective, but I mean federal in a stronger sense than the broad
definitions just cited. The federal model takes national federal systems like the
United States or Canada as appropriate comparators for the EU, and it measures
the EU against those systems in terms of regulatory reach, institutional capacity,
and democratic legitimacy. 33 The “intergovernmental” perspective, in contrast,
sees the EU as supplementary to national institutions. National governments, on
this view, remain the focus of politics and administration, and the EU institutions
are primary instrumental to the Members States’ pursuit of their own goals . 34
Proponents of this view tend to take a “liberal intergovernmentalist” approach to
the dynamics of European integration. On this view, “states are the driv ing forces
behind integration, . . . supranational actors are there largely at their behest, and . .
. such actors as such have little independent impact on the pace of integration.” 35
Both views of the EU can fit within the capacious category of “federal ”
systems, and comparisons to other federal states are relevant to both. But the two
perspectives suggest strongly divergent imperatives for European law.
29

Carl J. Friedrich, New Tendencies in Federal Theory and Practice, Sixth World Congress of
IPSA, at 1, 2 (Sept. 1964).
30

Burgess, supra note 24, at 227.

31

See Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 28, at 47.

32

See Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community , 99 Colum. L. Rev. 628 (1999).
33

See, e.g., Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe x-xi (2001) (urging that integrating treaties
“amount to a major step towards creating a federal state in Europe” and that “American
federalism” “provides the crucial point of reference fo the the apptempt to create a European
federal state today”).
34

See, e.g., Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 28 (taking this view); see also Peter
L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation -State (2010); Leonard F.
M. Besslink, National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon, 6 Utrecht L. Rev. 36,
38-42 (Nov. 2010) (suggesting that the intergovernmental view of the EU has come to
predominate after the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties).
35

Paul Craig, The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy, and Legitimacy, in Paul
Craig & Grainne de Burca, eds., The Evolution of EU Law 1 , 10 (1 st ed. 1999).
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A.

Federal Europe

The case for regarding the EU as closely analogous to other federal states
rests on the scope of its legislative competence and the sovereign power that it
exercises within that jurisdiction. By sovereignty, I mean simply the ability to
exercise power with finality—that is, without being countermanded or overruled
by some other actor. 36 The EU’s legislative competences are very broad—indeed,
it seems fair to say that they are quite comparable in scope to those of the U.S.
Congress. And although the EU treaties lack an American-style “Supremacy
Clause,” 37 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has made clear that European law
is both supreme over the law of the Member States and has direct effect within
those states. In these important respects, the EU looks li ke a federal state.
1.

Competences

American debates about federalism, as well as assessments of the state of
our federal union, tend to focus on the competence question —that is, the
allocation of regulatory authority between the nation and the states. The Supreme
Court’s biggest federalism case of the young twenty-first century, for example,
concerned whether Congress had constitutional authority to require individuals to
purchase health insurance as part of President Obama’s ambitious restructuring of
the American healthcare system. 38 And the dramatic changes in our federal
balance in the twentieth century are generally thought to be captured by the
expansion of Congress’s power, under contemporary interpretations of the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, to regulate virtually any aspect of
the national economy. 39 Although we continue to debate the outer limits of
Congress’s regulatory authority, all participants in those debates understand that
authority to be very broad. 40
The somewhat surprising fact, to American lawyers, is that European law
looks fundamentally similar in the extent of powers it grants to the center. As in
America, the EU started out with relatively narrow legislative jurisdiction and
seemingly strict limits on expansion; according to Joseph Weiler, “the ‘original’
understanding [of the various European agreements] was that the principle of
36

Cf. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *49 (1765) (“[T]here is and
must be in all [governments] a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which
the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside.”).
37

See U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
38

See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding
that Congress did have this power, but only on the somewhat implausible ground that the mandate
to purchase health insurance was actually a tax).
39

See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations 103 -04 (1991) (characterizing the
shift in understanding of the scope of Congress’s a uthority as a de facto constitutional
amendment).
40

See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual Federalism, in James E. Fleming
& Jacob T. Levy, eds., Federalism and Subsidiarity:Nomos LV 34, 54-57 (2014).

9

enumeration would be strict and that jurisdictional enlargement . . . could not be
lightly undertaken.” 41
The EU’s early incarnations—the Coal and Steel
Community, followed by the European Community—thus were focused entirely on
the establishment of a common market that provided “for free movement of factors
of production in order to facilitate the optimal allocation of resources.” 42 This also
entailed “‘flanking policies’ designed to prevent either the state or private parties
impeding the creation of a level playing field, as exemplified by the prohibition on
state aids, and the rules on competition.” 43
The initial listing of competences nonetheless included both specific
provisions of considerable potential breadth, such as Article 100a’s provision for
power over the internal market, 44 and a broad provision for implied powers in
Article 235. 45 The European Court of Justice interpreted these provisions
expansively. 46 The Court gave a broad reading to Article 235, the EU’s “necessary
and proper” clause, 47 and it made clear that it would act to promote integration
even in the absence of Community legislation. 48
A series of new treaties, moreover, each resulted in significant expansions
of the EU’s competences. The Single European Act of 1986 strengthened the EU’s
competences concerning the single market, made those competences easier to use
by shifting from unanimous voting in the Council to qualified majority in a
number of areas, and extended new competences concerning social policy,
including the health and safety of workers, as well as social cohesion. 49 The
Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties further expanded the Union’s competences,
adding citizenship, consumer policy, social policy, employment, public health,
foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs. 50 And as the scope of
41

J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L. J. 2403, 2433-34 (1991); see also id.
at 2434 (observing that this understanding was widely shared not only by scholars but also by the
Member States and Community institutions).
42

Paul Craig, Competence and Member State Autonomy: Causality, Consequence and Legitimacy ,
in Hans Wolfgang-Micklitz & Bruno De Witte, eds., The European Court of Justice and the
Autonomy of the Member States 11, 12 (2012).
43

Id.

44

See EC Treaty art. 100a.

45

See EC Treaty art. 235 (providing power to take measures that “should prove necessary to
attain . . . one of the objectives of the Community” in the event that “this Treaty has not provided
the necessary powers”).
46

Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649
(extending the Art. 28 of the EC Treaty’s prohibition on restrictions on the free movement of
goods to cover nondiscriminatory rules that inhibited trade simply because they were different
from the rules in the country of origin).
47

See Weiler, supra note 412445-46.

48

See, e.g., Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECR 631; see also Craig, Competence,
supra note 42, at 13-14.
49

See Craig, Competence, supra note 42, at 16.

50

See id. at 18.
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subjects on which Council unanimity was required for legislation continued to
shrink, Community institutions were able to follow up the grants of competences
in the treaties with a plethora of legislation. In particular, “[t]he Commission and
the European Council . . . conceptualized the single market in a broader, more
holistic, manner. Consumer welfare, social policy, and environmental policy were
regarded as important facets of the internal market strategy.” 51
All this should seem familiar to American observers. Most national
legislation rests on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, and
although some have sought to limit that power to purely “economic” legislation, 52
that position has never gotten very far. The commerce power is thus frequently
used for social ends—it is the basis, for example, for federal statutes restricting
marijuana use, 53 “partial birth” abortion, 54 and racial and gender discrimination by
private actors. 55 So it is unsurprising to see broad central power over the
economic market mutate into broad central power to make social policy; if
anything, the surprise is that Europeans thought they needed explicit textual
additions to the treaties in order to make this leap. If one wanted to mandate
access to abortion at EU level, for instance, any American law student would be
able to make an argument that uniform rules governing access to reproductive
choice is necessary to ensure the free movement of persons and access to careers
throughout the single European market. 56 That this would likely strike many
Europeans as an implausible extension of the EU’s original competences into the
social field suggests, more than anything, a profound difference in legal culture —
and a puzzle for comparative scholars.
The bottom line is that conferral of limited and enumerated powers has
largely failed as a strategy for limiting central power in America. 57 It is not all that

51

Id. at 20.

52

See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal law prohibiting
the transport of goods produced by child labor across stat e lines, on the ground that the interstate
movement of those goods was a pretext for achieving a social policy of prohibiting child labor).
Hammer was overruled in United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
53

See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
(upholding the Controlled Substances Act, as applied to the medicinal consumption of
homegrown marijuana, under the Commerce Clause).
54

See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531.

55

See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (forbidding discrimination in
public accomodations); Katzenbach v. McClung (upholding Title II as a valid exercise of the
Commerce Power).
56

Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (joint
opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ) (“[T]he ability of women to participate equally in
the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.”).
57

See, e.g., Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 88, at 1786; Edward S. Corwin, The
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1950).
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surprising to find that a similar strategy has not worked well in Europe, 58 and that
the Community has been able to exercise a broad range of powers comparable to a
relatively centralized federal state.
2.

Sovereignty

Americans tend, on the other hand, to take the sovereignty questions for
granted. The key issues were settled long ago. The Constitution explicitly declared
the supremacy of national law, and the Supreme Court early on held that the States
may not exercise their own powers in ways that interfere with federal legislation
or federal institutions. 59 Talk of state sovereignty thus generally refers to the
States’ legislative authority in those few areas falling outside the scope of
Congress’s enumerated powers or the integrity of state governmental institutions
vis-à-vis federal interference. 60 But no one questions the supremacy or direct
effect of national law. 61
Europe’s treaties lacked an explicit Supremacy Clause, and the ECJ’s role
has been correspondingly important in establishing the sovereignty of European
law. Beginning in the 1960s, the Court announced that EU law had direct effect
within national legal systems 62 and was, in fact, supreme over national law. 63
Moreover, the Court determined that when EU competences overlapped with areas
of reserved Member State authority, EU law would nonetheless prevail. 64 To an

58

See, e.g., Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of
European Law 184-88 (2009).
59

See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that Maryland could
not impose a tax on the Bank of the United States); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012) (holding that Arizona could not adopt laws interfering with national immigration
policy).
60

See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not
“commandeer” state officials by forcing them to enforce federal law); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not subject the states to private suits for money
damages).
61

Although the federal courts have developed an extensive jurisprudence of preemption, the
courts in such cases simply attempt to divine how far Congress has intended to displace state law
by enacting a federal statute; they do not question Congress’s power to do so. See, e.g., Ernest A.
Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts
Court, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 253 (surveying preemption jurisprudence).
62

Case 26/62, Algemene Transport-en Expedetie Onderneming van Gend en Loos NV v.
Nederlands Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
63

See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594, [1 964] C.M.L.R. 425, 455 (1964);
see also Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr -und Vorratsstelle ffir
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1134 para. 3, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255, 283 para. 3
(1972) ("[T]he validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be
affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the
constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional structure.").
64

Case 9/74, Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt Munchen, 1974 E.C.R. 773, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 423
(1974).
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American observer, it is as if Chief Justice John Marshall had decided McCulloch
v. Maryland 65 without the benefit of any explicit textual support.
Certain aspects of the sovereignty of EU law remain contested in principle,
if rarely contravened in practice. In a number of high profile cases, national
constitutional courts—particularly the German Federal Constitutional Court
(GFCC)—have insisted on two important qualifications to the supremacy of
European law. The first is that although the GFCC generally concedes the
supremacy of EU law, it has long claimed kompetanz kompetanz—that is, the right
to a final say concerning whether the EU institutions have transgressed the
limitations of their competences as provided in the treaties. 66 The constitutional
courts of several other Member States have taken a similar position. 67 The U.S.
Supreme Court confronted this issue early on in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 68
which held that the U.S. Supreme Court had constitutional authority to review
decisions of the state supreme courts on matters of federal law. 69 In Europe, by
contrast, the old Virginian opponents of national judicial supremacy appear to be
winning. 70 On the other hand, the GFCC has yet actually to find any EU actions
invalid, preferring to uphold EU actions while insisting on its right to decide. 71
The second qualification is that the GFCC, again joined by several other
national courts, insists that European law cannot trump certain aspects of domestic

65

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (broadly construing Congress’s implied powers under Article I’s
“necessary and proper” clause and holding that state law could not interfere wi th the valid
exercise of federal powers).
66

See Brunner v. European Union Treaty, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (1993); see also Julio Baquero
Cruz, The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, 14 Eur. L. J. 389, 392-93
(2008); Erin Delaney, Managing in a Federal System without an “Ultimate Arbiter’: Kompetenz Kompetenz in the EU and the Ante-bellum United States, 15 Reg. & Fed. Stud. 225 (2005).
67

See, e.g., the decision of the Danish Supreme Court in Carlson and Others v. Rasmussen, Case
No. I-361/1997 (1998) (insisting that “national courts cannot be deprived of their right to examine
the question of whether a particular EC legal act exceeds the limits for a transfer of sovereignty
brought about by the Act of Accession”); see also Cruz, supra note 66, at 398-402 (noting similar
decisions by the constitutional courts of Poland, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France, and Spain);
Delaney, supra note 66, at 232.
68

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

69

The issue was not politically settled, however, until the late nineteenth century. See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 474-76 (7th ed. 2015).
70

See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815 -1835, at 496
(1991) (describing the Virginia view that state courts are bound by federal law, but not by the
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of that law).
71

See, e.g., Delaney, supra note 66, at 233 (describing conflict avoidance by both the GFCC and
the ECJ); see also Christian Joerges, Is There a Guardian of Constitutionalism in the European
Union?, in Champeau, Closa, Innerarity, & Maduro, supra note 4, at 75, 80 (arguing that the
GFCC’s cases concerning the Euro crisis have “consolidat[ed]” the GFCC’s “ambiguous
reputation” as “a dog ‘that barks but does not bite’”).
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constitutional law. 72 One may find an EU law hook for this position in the
Maastricht and Lisbon treaties’ commitment to respect the “national identity” of
the Member States, which may be read to include their constitutional identity. 73 In
the United States, it is well established not only that federal law trumps state law,
but that this relationship is indifferent as to the form that state law takes. Hence,
even a federal regulation issued by a federal administrative agency can trump a
state constitutional provision, so long as the regulation was validly issued. 74 This
makes some sense in light of the States’ tendency to enshrine mundane (and often
seemingly random) provisions in the state constitution rather than statute law; for
instance, the New York Constitution regulates the width of ski trails. 75
The German Basic Law, in contrast, explicitly sets certain provisions apart
as unamendable, including the provisions on democratic authority upon which the
GFCC has relied in its challenges to European law. 76 More generally, the European
human rights tradition has generally been more willing than the American to
ground those rights in universal and fundamental values—a tendency that not only
sets certain constitutional principles apart from ordinary law but also suggests they
should be binding on the EU as well as particular Member States. 77 Hence, several
European national courts have limited their exceptions to EU supremacy to
“fundamental” principles in national constitutions. 78
72

See, e.g., Gareth Davies, Constitutional Disagreement in Europe and the Search for Pluralism ,
in J. Komarek & M. Avbelj, eds., Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond
269, 272-74 (2012); Leonard F. M. Besselink, National and Constitutional Identity Before and
After Lisbon, 6 Utrecht L. Rev. 36, 46 (2010) (“[T]he highest and constitutional courts in the
large majority of Member States do not recognize [EU law’s] precedence over the national
constitution.”); Cruz, supra note 66, at 398-402.
73

See Besselink, supra note 72, at 47-48.

74

See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 151, 153 (1982)
(“Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.”); Van Patten v.
Jensen, 773 P.2d 62, 64 (Wa. 1989) (holding a state constitutional provision preempted by a
federal regulation). The conclusion that federal regulations are supreme federal law is, to put it
mildly, not obvious from the text of the Supremacy Clause, which speaks in terms of federal
statutes, treaties, and cosnstitutional provisions. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy
Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 91 (2003). But the doctrine is
well settled.
75

See N.Y. Const. art. XIV, § 1. But see Emily Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong
Places: Why State Constitutions Contain America’s Positive Rights 28-32 (2013) (explaining that
NY’s infamous ski trail provision was part of a constitutional commitment to the conservation of
public lands and that state constitutions in fact contain a range of fundamental c ommitments).
76

Art. 79, para. 3 GG. That quality forecloses any reading of German accession to the EU’s
treaties as overriding these basic commitments in national law.
77

See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971, 1975
(2004).
78

See, e.g., CC Décision no 2006-540 DC (27 July 2006) (holding that an EU law may be
declared to be in violation of the French constitution only if it infringes a rule or principle that is
inherent in French “constitutional identity”); Italian Fragd Case, Corte Costitutzionale, Decision
No. 232, April 21, 1989, 72 RDI (1989) 103 (limiting invalidity of EU law to conflicts with
“fundamental” principles of Italian constitution); see generally Besselink, supra note 72, at 46-
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Not altogether surprisingly, the ECJ has taken the view that national
constitutions are subordinate to EU law. 79 It is not hard to see why. American
lawyers, who may be more conditioned to opportunistic invocations of
constitutional principle, can readily imagine a Member State using its national
constitution as a basis for opting out of some aspect of European law that doesn’t
suit its interests. So far this does not seem to have happened. Although some
national court decisions have struck down particular provisions of EU law for
incompatibility with national constitutions, 80 these isolated cases do not appear to
have sparked a fundamental conflict between courts. Indeed, the ECJ seems to
have avoided pressing the issue by moderating its position in some recent cases. 81
Still, we should not rule out the possibility that one or both sides may in future
choose to play what Mark Tushnet calls “constitutional hardball.” 82 The erosion of
the national veto in the Council, for example, may encourage States to press other
means for opting out of policies they oppose. If that occurs, then the ECJ may feel
compelled to take a firm stand on the other side.
Rumblings about the limits of integration from the national courts may yet
break out into a fundamental disagreement about the nature and scope of the
European legal order—particularly in the case of the EU’s response to the Euro
47. The use of such a distinction underscores a fundamental difference in American and
European legal cultures. Conservative and liberal lawyers in America would be unlikely to agree
on which constitutional rights were “fundamental” or part of an American constitutional
“identity”—abortion? the right to bear arms? —and they certainly would not trust a court to
decide that issue for them. The ECJ has recently suggested that it may have the authority to
decide which aspects of national constitutions are crucial in this way —a step that may raise the
same sort of controversies even among less contentious Europeans. See Case C 213/07,
Michaniki AE v Ethniko Simboulio Radiotilearasis [2008] ECJ 16; see also Besselink, supra note
72, at 48 (discussing Michaniki and recognizing that “it is a risky enterprise to project a EU
ranking of values onto national constitutional law”).
79

See Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr - und Vorratsstelle für
Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125 (“[T]he validity of a Community measure or its effect
within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental
rights as formulated by the Constitution of that state or the principles of a national constitutional
structure.”).
80

See, e.g., Oreste Pollicino, European Arrest Warrant and Constitutional Principles of the
Member States, 9 German L. J. 1313 (2008) (discussing decisions by the GFCC as well as the
constitutional courts of Poland and Cyprus invalidating national laws implementing an EU
directive creating a European arrest warrant).
81

See, e.g., Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v
Overbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR 1-9609 (holding that a German law
challenged under European law as a impediment to the free movement of goods was valid because
the national courts had determined the law to be necessary to protection of human dignity under
the German Basic Law); see also Besselink, supra note 72, at 45-46 (suggesting that the ECJ now
takes a more nuanced approach and is “far beyond” its earlier position) .
82

See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523 (2004). Wikipedia’s
definition captures Tushnet’s use of the term well: “Hardball . . . generally refers to baseball (as
opposed to its variant softball), especially when played very competitively. Metaphorically, it
refers to uncompromising and ruthless methods or dealings, especially in politics.” Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardball, visited Feb. 17, 2014.
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crisis. 83 That conflict has not yet materialized however. In the vast range of cases
that do not implicate fundamental rights or democratic principles, the supremacy
of EU law seems hardly less well-established than in the United States.
3.

Subsidiarity

The treaties do contain one legal check on the exercise of central
competence that has no immediate analog in America—the principle of
“subsidiarity,” added to what is now Article V of the EC Treaty by the Treaty of
Maastricht. That principle provides that
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved by the Community. 84
As Ed Swaine has observed, “[s]ubsidiarity is a critical reaction not only to the
gradual shift in legislative authority from the Member States-dominated Council to
more autonomous Community institutions, but also to the Court of Justice’s
expansive interpretation of Community powers against the apparent interest of
Member States.” 85 Subsidiarity operates in conjunction with the principle of
conferral—analogous to the American notion of enumerated powers—and
proportionality, which holds that “[a]ny action by the Community shall not go
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.” 86
Subsidiarity’s advocates originally thought that the principle would be
judicially enforced, but the ECJ has largely disappointed those hoping for a
significant judicial check on EU action. 87 This is not surprising: In America, the
Supreme Court has exerted relatively little constraint on centralization, and
comparative research suggests that constitutional courts are generally better at
83

See Part II.B, infra.

84

EC Treaty art. 5.

85

Edward T. Swaine, Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice,
41 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1, 5 (2000); see also Young, European Union, supra note 18, at 1677-82
(discussing subsidiarity).
86

EC Treaty art. 5.
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See, e.g., Paul Craig, Institutions, Power, and Institutional Balance, in Paul Craig & Grainne de
Burca, eds., The Evolution of EU Law 41 (2d ed. 2011) (stating that subsidiarity has not providd
an “effective limit”); Christoph Ritzer, Marc Ruttloff, & Karin Linhart, How to Sharpen a Dull
Sword—The Principle of Subsidiarity and its Control, 7 German L. J. 733, 760 (2006) (“In the
jurisprudence of the European Courts the principle of subsidiarity has so far only been of little
value as a standard of scrutiny.”); Jan M. Smits, Who Does What? On Cameron, Rutte and the
Optimal Distribution of Competences Among the European Union and the Member States,
Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No. 2013/16 (December 7, 2013), at 7,
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364730 (“[I]n the twenty years since this principle
was codified . . . it did not develop into a useful criterion for the vertical distribution of
competences.”).
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reining in subnational units than at preventing central overreach. 88 Moreover,
subsidiarity calls for a predictive judgment about the relative effectiveness of
action at various levels of government that courts are ill -equipped to make, and the
principle itself provides no guidance as to what sort of tradeoffs between the
policy under consideration and the values of localism should be made. 89 It is hard
to sustain the legitimacy of a judicial check on legislative decisions when the
factors that the courts must consider are substantively identical to those already
passed upon by the legislature. 90 If anything, the failure of subsidiarity as a
principle of judicial review in Europe ought to give pause to American scholars
who have pressed courts to use a similar principle to construe the reach of
Congress’s legislative powers. 91
More recently, however, subsidiarity advocates have emphasized its utility
as a principle to guide—and to be enforced by—political institutions. A protocol
in the Treaty of Amsterdam required the EU’s central institutions to respect the
principle of subsidiarity in the exercise of their powers and required those
institutions, particularly the Commission, to jump through a number of procedural
hoops before exercisting power at EU level. 92 American law contains similar
features, but they have not done much. Every recent president, for example, has
issued an executive order on federalism requiring federal agencies to consider the
impact of proposed actions and regulations on state law and autonomy, 93 but these
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See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence,
and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1733, 1751-53 (2005) (noting the
predominantly centralizing role of the Supreme Court in American history); Jenna Bednar,
William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, A Political Theory of Federalism, in John Ferejohn,
Jack N. Rakove, & Jonathan Riley, eds., Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule 223, 233
(2001) (concluding that institutional factors make constitutional courts situated at the center more
likely to check subnational divergence from national norms than overreach by the central
authority).
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See Young, European Union, supra note 85, at 1678-80; George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 Colum.
L. Rev. 331, 391 (1994) (“The same characteristics that make the inquiry difficult for the political
branches to conduct—namely, uncertainty about how much localism really matters on a given
issue, the heavy reliance on prediction and the probabilities of competing scenarios, the
possibility of discretionary tradeoffs between subsidiarity and proportionality, and the sheer
exercise of political judgment entailed —make the inquiry even more problematic for the Court.”).
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See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev.
125, 174-75.
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See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115 (2010); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional
Federalism, 74 T EX . L. R EV . 795, 826-27 (1996); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the
Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 554,
557 (1995).
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See TEU Protocol No. 2 (1997).
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See, e.g., Preemption: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74
Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693–94 (May 20, 2009) (Obama); Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg.
43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (Clinton).
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analyses have generally been pro forma when issued; more frequently, agencies
have simply ignored the requirement altogether. 94
The Lisbon Treaty went further by incorporating the subsidiarity eleme nts
of the failed Constitutional Treaty, which retained “[s]ubsidiarity [as] the
centrepiece of competence control” 95 but continued the shift from judicial to
political implementation. Lisbon established an elaborate procedure whereby
national parliaments would have a voice in determining whether proposed EU
legislation satisfies the subsidiarity principle. 96 It remains to be seen whether this
new institutional framework for implementing subsidiarity will make a practical
difference. However, these frameworks will not eliminate Professor Davies’ more
principled objection to subsidiarity as a constraint on EU action, which is that it
necessarily asks only whether an EU policy can be more effectively vindicated by
Member State action—not whether the Member States’ own policies and
preferences should have independent weight. 97
4.

Constitutionalism and the Democratic Deficit

In any event, neither subsidiarity nor the strong political checks built into
the EU’s structure have prevented the accumulation of a vast range of
competences at the center. Disagreement remains as to whether the treaty’s broad
allocations of competence or their subsequent interpretation by the ECJ is to
blame, 98 but there is little doubt that the European Union’s authority is now very
broad indeed. It seems fair to say, in fact, that outside the realm of foreign and
defence policy (an important exception), the competences of the EU institutions
are no less impressive than those of the U.S. Congress. Scholars and politicians
debate the proportion of the law in any given Member State that emanates from
Brussels, but even conservative estimates see a very significant EU imprint on
national legal systems. 99
As Gareth Davies has written, “[t]he scope of
Community activity is now so broad that few if any areas of national policy are
immune from its effects.” 100 And EU law is sovereign in the same sense as federal
94

See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 737, 782-86 (2004).
On the broader notion of enforcing limits on national power through the administrative process,
compare Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 Duke L. J. 1933 (2008) (praising the
idea), with Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative
Federalism without Congress, 57 Duke L. J. 2111 (2009) (throwing cold water).
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Common Mkt. L. Rev. 63, 67 (2006).
96
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law in the United States: EU law has direct effect within the Member States, and,
subject to certain narrow reservations voiced by national courts, it is supreme over
those states’ own laws.
This view of the EU as a federal state has implications for how the EU
should move forward. It lends plausibility, for one thing, to the recent movement
to replace the EU’s amalgam of treaties with an honest-to-goodness constitution.
Treaties, after all, are for alliances and supranational institutions —not integrated
federal states. That the Member States considered it possible to just drop the
“constitutional” treaty after its rejection by France and the Netherlands in 2005—
while adopting much of its substance in the Lisbon Treaty—suggests limits on a
federalist perspective. But one suspects that aspirations for a form al constitution
will not remain dead forever.
The constitutionalist movement, moreover, was not just about form but also
about substance. The expansion of EU competence has been accompanied by a
significant politicization of the EU’s functions. As Hartmut Kaelble has observed,
“important new fields became part of a broadly based and widely debated process
of Europeanization including labor markets, consumer and environmental
protection, human rights, foreign workers, student exchange programs, university
exams, drivers’ licenses, identity cards, and border controls.” 101 The result was
that “[a]fter the mid-1980s, debates on Europe became more contentious, with
increasingly clear contrasts between supporters and opponents of the European
project.” 102 One consequence is that debates about constitutional structure are
increasingly driven by preferences about outcomes. 103 That situation is, of course,
familiar to American constitutional lawyers.
In the early days of the European Community, the Community’s powers
were grounded in peace and prosperity. The general project of integration rested
on a moral commitment to preventing war in Europe and particular policies could
count on deference to technocratic expertise. 104 As Professor Kaelble puts it,
“there had existed a diffuse and largely uncontroversial general support for
complicated expert decisions, for example on the creation of a common market, a
common agricultural policy, and various European funds.” 105 As memories of war
faded and the post-war recovery boom abated, peace was taken for granted and
prosperity was called into question. Moreover, the expansion of the EU’s
legislative competence brought European law into areas where the public is less
willing to defer to technocratic expertise. Europe has thus s een not only calls to
recalibrate its goals—typically, by emphasizing social protection alongside
101
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economic liberalization—but also to democratize its processes. Paul Craig
describes this movement as a shift from “output legitimacy” to “input
legitimacy.” 106 Delivering peace and prosperity is no longer enough; citizens
expect a right to participate in a democratic process of governance.
If the EU is held to the “input” standards of a “national” democracy, then it
looks highly unsatisfactory in at least two respects. First, the only arm of EU
government that is directly elected by the People—the European Parliament—
continues to have meager authority compared to national parliaments of the
Member States. 107 More fundamentally, many observers have questioned whether
democratic politics can even exist at the European level, because Europe lacks
pan-European political parties and most citizens do not self-identify as “European”
rather than French or German or Latvian. 108
Importantly, this perspective sees the current arrangements as inherently
unstable and in need of reform. It is unacceptable, on this view, for Brussels to
wield the scope of power that it does without becoming more democratic and
developing a deeper well of popular identification. These criticisms have thus
yielded several imperatives for reform—some of which is already underway. The
last several treaties have incrementally expanded the European Parliament’s role
in various ways. 109 Brussels has taken steps to improve the oft-criticized
transparency of EU governmental processes. 110 And the EU has undertaken a
variety of initiatives—creating and promoting a flag, for instance, and a pantheon
of pan-European heroes 111—to bolster a sense of “European” identity among its
citizens. All of these measures are designed to help bring the EU’s democratic
legitimacy and popular mandate in line with the scope and effect of its legislative
power.
It may be that, as Professor Moravcsik argues, “[t]he issues publics care
about most remain overwhelmingly national,” and that “[t]he issues the EU deals
with most intensely—trade, industrial regulation, technical standardization, soft
power projection, foreign aid, agricultural policy, infrastructural, and general
foreign policy—are not salient issues for the mass public.” 112 This particular
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assessment from 2007, which discounted the salience of the EU’s role in monetary
policy as “obscure” in circumstances “short of a crisis,” 113 has likely been
overtaken by events. But there is also little doubt that the overall salience and
politicization of EU activity has increased as the EU’s competences have
expanded, and many have responded by urging reforms that will significantly
enhance the EU’s resemblance to a federal state. 114
B.

Intergovernmental Europe

A second perspective finds all this talk of “democratic deficit” and
“European identity” misguided. On this view, the EU is not a nascent federal
system but rather an extremely successful international organization. As Andrew
Moravcsik has written, “[t]he EU remains, despite a few federal elements,
essentially a confederation of nation-states: the most ambitious and successful
among international organizations, rather than a federation aiming to replicate and
supplant European nation-states.” 115 It remains true, for example, that “the Union
is treaty-based and is characterized by voluntary membership and unanimity
requirements for treaty amendments and other key decisions. ” 116
This intergovernmental perspective gives relatively short shrift to the
scope of the EU’s regulatory jurisdiction 117 and the sovereign effect of EU
legislation and instead focuses on the EU’s limited institutional capacity, the
primary role of national governments in implementing EU law, and the tendency
of EU citizens to identify primarily with their Member States. These factors
severely constrain the EU’s ability to act in the manner of a centralized
government; hence, on this view, it is better to think of the EU as a new form of
supranational governance. 118
1.

Governmental Capacity

The most outspoken advocate for this intergovernmental perspective,
Professor Moravcsik, emphasizes that “the EU does not (with a few exceptions)
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enjoy the power to coerce, administer, or tax.” 119 It may be useful to think of three
distinct dimensions of the EU’s governmental capacity: its capacity to make
decisions that are autonomous vis-à-vis the Member States; its institutional and
financial resources; and its ability to raise those resources and regulate via
taxation. In each of these areas, the EU institutions seem far more constrained
than a federal state like the U.S.
First, decision-making. American federalism scholars have long known
that the procedures by which a central government makes law provide a key
measure of its power; after all, the more easily the center can make law, the more
likely it is to make inroads on the periphery’s autonomy. 120 Professor Moravcsik
argues that it is extremely difficult for the EU institutions to make law:
“Formally, [the European lawmaking process] makes everyday legislation in the
EU as difficult to enact as a constitutional amendment in the USA.” 121 If that were
true, however, then one would expect to see a lot less EU legislation than Brussels
manages, in fact, to produce. In the two-year period of 2008 and 2009, the EU
Council and Commission enacted a total of 253 directives and 2157 regulations. 122
By way of comparison, the 110 th Congress enacted 460 laws in the same period. 123
There are, of course, all sorts of problems in comparing raw numbers of laws
enacted in the two systems. But while the apples-to-oranges difficulty might slow
down a claim that the EU legislates far more easily than Congress, it seems hard to
deny that Brussels has a capacity to enact legislation comparable to that of a
federal state.
Likewise, Professor Moravcsik suggests that “constitutional” change—that
is, change to the governing treaties—is more difficult in the EU than in “any
modern democracy except perhaps that of Switzerland.” 124 And yet we have seen
significant and extensive revisions to the treaties in 1965 (Brussels), 1986 (Single
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European Act), 1992 (Maastricht), 1997 (Amsterdam), 2001 (Nice), and 2007
(Lisbon). In the same period, there have been only five amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, and none of them dealt with matters of equivalent significanc e to the
EU’s treaty revisions. 125 If it’s so hard to change the EU legal order, why does it
happen so often?
The question is only partly rhetorical, because Professor Moravcsik is
plainly right that the institutional gauntlet confronting both legislation and treaty
revision in Europe is quite daunting. If the American producers of “Schoolhouse
Rock” were to create an “I’m Just a Directive” cartoon to explain the process of
EU legislation, 126 the protagonist legislative proposal would face a longer and
more intimidating journey in Brussels than in Washington, D.C. As Moravcsik
explains, “[f]or legislation to pass, the Commission must propose (by majority or
consensus), the Council of Ministers must decide (by supermajority vote), [and]
European parliamentarians must assent (by absolute majority of members).” 127 The
EU’s ability to produce so much law and to agree on such frequent and farreaching “constitutional” change is thus a significant puzzle for comparative
scholars.
One thing seems clear, however. The EU legislative process incorporates a
great deal more political constraint on central lawmaking that adversely affects the
Member States than does its American analog. First and foremost, the EU Council
directly represents the individual Member States. American scholars debate
whether members of the U.S. Congress, elected by their States (or from districts
within their States) but not accountable to the governments of their States, are
likely to act on behalf of their States’ interests once in Washington, D.C. 128 The
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Council, by contrast, simply is the Member State governments. When the Council
meets to consider issues in particular policy areas, it is composed of the Member
States’ respective ministers for those areas. And when it meets as the Council of
Europe, it is composed of the respective heads of state. 129 Some scholars have
concluded that [t]hese powerful structural safeguards for state interests make
Euroskeptic fears of a European superstate utterly implausible .” 130
For much of the EU’s history, legislation required unanimous approval in
the Council, thereby giving each Member State a veto over policies that adversely
affected its interests. 131 Now, most EU legislation in the Union’s more traditional
fields of competence proceeds by “qualified majority.” 132 This process requires
that legislative proposals be approved by a supermajority of votes in the council,
with each state’s vote weighted according to population as assigned in the
treaties. 133 The Treaty of Lisbon now “defines a qualified majority as (1) the votes
(1954) (arguing that members of Congress do represent their states’ institutional interests), with
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000) (denying that members of Congress care about the institutional
interests of state governments but claiming that political parties facilitate representation of those
interests in national councils), with Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the
Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L. J. 75, 106-33 (2001) (criticizing “political
safeguards” theories based on both congressional representation and political parties ). Prior to
the Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, U.S. Senators were elected by the state legislatures
and thus directly accountable to their state governments. But even under that regime, it was
debatable how responsive to the wishes of those governments senators actually were. See, e.g.,
Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1347, 1353-55 (1996) (noting that pre-17th
Amendment senators were often thought to be more beholden to corrupt interests, and that in any
event many states had enacted regimes of de facto direct election by the people).
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of fifty-five percent of the Member States, (2) representing at least fifteen states,
and (3) representing sixty-five percent of the EU population.” 134 This procedure
prevents a single state, or even a small coalition of the largest states, from
blocking legislation. 135 In principle, the advent of qualified majority voting is a
development of enormous significance. As Luuk van Middelaar has observed, “the
transition from decision-making by unanimity to decision-making by majority [is
the point at which] the whole became greater than the sum of its parts.” 136
That said, there is reason to question the practical significance of this
change. As the Economist put it, “the EU almost never votes. The council of
ministers is not some parliament where late night decisions can fall on a single
vote, leaving whips counting every last member of their party through the division
lobbies. The EU vastly prefers to take decisions by consensus. ” 137 In 2008, for
example, the Council took 147 decisions, of which 128 were unanimous. 138
On the other hand, 19 of those decisions were not unanimous. Gone are the
days of the Luxembourg Accords, under which the Member States largely agreed
to allow a single state to block qualified majority voting in the name of its vital
interests. 139 The bottom line is that the Council operates under strong norms of
consensus, but the formal, law-based guarantees of consensus have substantially
eroded. Recent American experience concerning the elimination of Senate
filibusters for most presidential nominations demonstrates that norms of consensus
may evaporate when political divisions become bitter and entrenched, paving the
way for power politics in which the hard-wired legal voting rules are the only ones
134
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that matter. 140 The EU has seen constitutional “hardball” before, and it may well
see it again. 141
For now, however, there is little doubt that the “political safeguards of
federalism”—that is, checks on the full exercise of the center’s allocated
competences derived from the incorporation of peripheral voices in the central
political process—are much stronger in the EU than in the United States. 142 The
strength of those safeguards no doubt goes a long way toward explaining why the
Member States were willing to grant such broad powers to the center in the first
place. Concerns about the scope of EU competences have grown as formal
unanimity has given way to qualified-majority voting. 143 But the clout that
Member States exercise in the Council continues to offer strong support for an
intergovernmental view of the EU legislative process.
The intergovernmental view seems even stronger when it comes to
administrative and fiscal capacity. The EU is, as Daniel Ziblatt notes, “fiscally
speaking, a political pygmy; its actual budget is minuscule, and it is arguably the
largest political unit in history without the power to raise debt for itself.” 144 EU
revenue comes predominantly from three sources: duties on imports, collected by
the Member States and transferred to the EU; a share of the value-added tax
collected by the Member States; and a levy on the gross national income of each
140

See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrates Trigger ‘Nuclear Option’; Eliminate Most Filibusters on
Nominees,
Wash.
Post,
Nov.
21,
2013,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate -poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-thatwould-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0fd2ca728e67c_story.html. This would be another example of Professor Tushnet’s “constitutional
hardball.” See supra note 82.
141

See, e.g., Van Middelaar, supra note 111, at 58 (discussing France’s “politics of the empty
chair”).
142

To put the situation in terms of American legislative procedure, the current state of EU
legislation seems analogous not simply to a pre -Seventeenth Amendment U.S. Senate, in which
the Senators are selected by the state legislatures, but rather on e in which those legislatures also
have an absolute right to instruct their Senators on particular votes and in which each Senator has
a “blue slip”-like veto over not only nominees to office, as in this country, but much legislation.
Again, the puzzle is that so much EU legislation is produced under these conditions.
143

See Smits, supra note 87 (discussing initiatives by both the English and Dutch governments to
review the allocation of competences between the Union and its Member States). The euro crisis,
moreover, seems to have dampened enthusiasm for further expansion of EU competences. See
Pisani-Ferry, supra note 22, at 175 (observing that, in the crisis’s aftermath, “governments in
Europe have limited esteem for the European institutions . . . and they are very reluctant to
transfer competences and powers to Brussels”).
144

Daniel Ziblatt, Between Centralization and Federalism in the European Union , in Paule E.
Peterson & Daniel Nadler, eds., The Global Debt Crisis: Haunting U.S. and European Federalism
113, 113 (2014); see also Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 28, at 35
(“Redistributing wealth by taxation and spending is the preeminent activty of the modern state,
yet the EU does little of this.”). The EU’s “Europea” website is eager to make clear that
“[n]ational governments are responsible for raising taxes and setting tax rates. The amount of tax
you pay is therefore decided by your national government, not the EU.” Taxation, europa.eu,
http://europa.eu/pol/tax/index_en.htm (visited Feb. 9, 2014)..

26

Member State capped at slightly under 1.3 percent. 145 The last of these—which is
simply a transfer from Member State budgets to the central authority—now
accounts for about sixty percent of EU revenue. 146 In this, the EU looks much like
America under the Articles of Confederation (although without the incessant
failures by the American states to actually pay their contributions 147). None of this
yields a great deal of revenue, and even the duties and VAT components are not
structured in such a way as to allow the EU much flexibility to pursue regulatory
objectives through the tax code. 148
Consonant with these modest revenues, the EU accounts for only about two
percent of European public spending; the U.S. national government, on the other
hand, collects roughly 70 percent of American tax revenue. 149 Most of the EU
budget goes to the common agricultural policy and transfers to developing regio ns;
“[l]ittle room exists for discretionary spending by Brussels technocrats.” 150 The
lack of broad fiscal powers sharply constrains the sorts of policies that the EU can
enact and, therefore, the functions that Brussels can “take over” from the Member
States. As Giandomenico Majone has suggested, lack of fiscal authority
effectively limits the EU to regulatory policies, as opposed to non -regulatory or
benefits-based programs. 151
These fiscal constraints also deprive the EU
institutions of a tool frequently used by Congress to regulate outside the scope of
its enumerated authority, which is the ability to make large financial grants to state
governments conditioned on the implementation of federal policies that Congress
could not enact directly. 152 And as I discuss further below, the EU’s budgetary
constraints leave few opportunities to win the loyalty of European citizens by
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providing essential benefits analogous to American programs like Social Security
or Medicare. 153
2.

Administrative Capacity and Implementation

Shifting focus to the EU’s administrative capacity reveals a similar picture.
As Professor Moravcsik points out, “the notion of a European ‘superstate’
swarming with Brussels bureaucrats is a delusion (or deception) of
Euroskeptics.” 154 The European Commission, the principal administrative arm of
the EU, employed 32,666 people in 2013—which made it about half the size of the
U.S. Social Security Administration and a slightl y smaller employer than the City
of Chicago. 155 Outside certain key institutions like the European Central Bank or
the Commission’s Competition Directorate, the overwhelming responsibility for
enforcing EU law falls to the Member States. 156
This fact raises one of the most interesting contrasts in comparative
federalism. A key exception to the U.S. Supreme Court’s generally laissez faire
approach to constitutional federalism is the anti-commandeering doctrine, which
holds that Congress may not “commandeer” the states to implement federal law. 157
Nonetheless, although American doctrine forbids requiring the States to
implement national law, it remains the case that much federal law is implemented
by the States as a voluntary matter. 158 Hence, the American literature on
“cooperative federalism” 159—whereby State officials dominate the implementation
of federal law concerning education, social welfare, environmental protection, and
other crucial areas—may shed some light on the importance of Member State
implementation in Europe.
153
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In particular, Heather Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen’s work on
“uncooperative federalism” tends to highlight the ways in which the
implementation power may promote local autonomy. 160 In contrast to the “power
of the sovereign,” Professors Gerken and Bulman-Pozen emphasize the “power of
the servant” 161—that is, of the official charged with implementing a regulatory
directive. This power stems from several sources. These include the “dependence”
of the federal government on state officials to administer federal programs, which
gives state officials both “leverage” and “discretion in choosing how to
accomplish [their] tasks and which tasks to prioritize.” 162 State officials also
derive power from their “integration” into federal regulatory schemes; “[w]hen an
actor is embedded in a larger system,” Bulman-Pozen and Gerken argue, “a web of
connective tissues binds higher- and lower-level decisionmakers.
Regular
interactions generate trust and give lover-level decisionmakers the knowledge and
relationships they need to work the system.” 163 Finally, Bulman-Pozen and
Gerken note that state officials “serve two masters” in the sense that although they
are implementing federal policy, “their constituencies are based within the
state.” 164 This gives state officials both the incentive and the power to challenge
federal officials, because they are not beholden to federal officials for their
positions and have alternative sources of resources. 165
In the United States, this power of the servant may be undermined by the
option retained by the federal government to implement national laws on its own,
with federal personnel. If state officials do not implement the Clean Air Act in a
manner that meets federal standards, for example, the federal Environmental
Protection Agency can retract its delegation of implementation authority to the
states and operate the program directly. 166
Resumption of direct federal
implementation is costly, but because the federal government largely dominates
the tax base the additional outlay is hardly out of the question. In Europe, by
contrast, the authority and infrastructure to regulate directly from Brussels
generally will not exist, nor will the ability to raise revenue to support such an
expansion of authority.
One would expect, then, the phenomenon of
“uncooperative federalism” to operate even more strongly in Europe. And indeed
the EU has often structured its more intrusive policies so as to build in a range of
160
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acceptable implementation options up front. As Professor Moravcsik point s out,
“the single currency, the Schengen arrangement, and foreign policy cooperation . .
. tend not to bind all members of the EU to a common standard, but to permit a
level of internal flexibility unheard of in modern national governance.” 167 On the
most controversial measures—such as Schengen or the Euro—this flexibility has
included the option not to participate at all.
A final development may offset this “uncooperative federalism” dynamic in
Europe, however. One way around limitations on public enforcement of law—
whether originating in a subunit’s opposition or simply in limited public
enforcement resources—is to permit private parties to enforce that law on their
own. In the U.S., “private attorneys general” play a critical and pervasive role in
the enforcement of federal law, from antitrust and civil rights laws to
environmental and securities statutes. 168 Allowing private plaintiffs to enforce
national law through civil litigation not only takes advantage of private resources,
it also breaks the monopoly that federal and state executive officials would
otherwise have on the enforcement of those statutes. Private incentives and
resources may ratchet up enforcement levels under particular statutory regimes to
levels that public officials, exercising their discretion, might find undesirable;
likewise, private interests may favor expansive interpretations of national law that
would be politically untenable for federal (and especially state) bureaucrats.
Daniel Kelemen has recently demonstrated a similar phenomenon in
Europe, which he describes as a turn to “eurolegalism”. 169 Precisely because the
central governmental apparatus has such weak enforcement capacity, Professor
Kelemen argues, European law is increasingly recognizing American -style private
rights of action to enforce EU mandates. 170 “Across policy areas ranging from
employment discrimination to consumer protection to antitrust to securities
regulation to the free movement rights of workers, students, and even medical
patients,” Kelemen writes, “we can observe more coercive legal enforcement,
more rights claims, and a growing judicial role in shaping policy.” 171 Private
enforcement thus overcomes “the absence of a Eurocracy powerful enough to
enforce EU law from Brussels.” 172 To the extent that this trend continues, it may
well undermine the security that the EU’s generally bare-bones enforcement
appartus affords to Member State autonomy.

167

Moravcsik, Constitutional Settlement, supra note 28, at 34.

168

See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It
Matters, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2129 (2004).
169

R. Daniel Kelemen, Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European
Union (2011).
170

See id. at 8.

171

Id. at 5.

172

Id. at 8; see also id. at 41-79 (documenting changes in European legal procedures and legal
culture that facilitate private enforcement of European law).

30

3.

Identity

The last aspect of the European order tending to support the
intergovernmental viewpoint is the strong tendency of Europeans to identify
primarily with their national political communities. 173 In the United States, where
the overhwelming majority of Americans identify quite strongly with the nation,
the interesting questions concern whether they identify with their States as well. 174
We certainly have Americans; do we still have Vermonters, Califo rnians, or North
Carolinians? 175 Other observers have acknowledge a division of loyalties within
the American political community, but questioned whether it breaks down alon g
state lines. 176 Europe has the opposite problem: Citizens strongly identify with
their Member States—as Frenchmen, Germans, or Poles—but it is not clear they
think of themselves as “Europeans.” 177 Both the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties
bow to this reality by stating explicitly that “[t]he Union shall respect the national
Identities of its Member States.” 178
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institutional dimension:

The Lisbon treaty is considerably more specific and adds an

The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well
as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self -government. It shall respect
their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the
State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.
In
particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member
State.
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Thomas Risse’s collection of survey data indicates that very few
individuals identify themselves as either exclusively or primarily European . The
numbers, which were quite stable over the period between 1992 and 2004, hovered
around ten percent for these two categories combined. 179 This does not necessarily
translate into widespread dislike or distrust of the EU. For much of the Union’s
history, “[a] strong and stable majority of Europeans [has supported] EU
integration.” 180 And even when polling data have indicated “a level of skepticism
about both the EU and about political institutions in general,” the EU institutions
have been “clearly more trusted by Europeans than national parliaments and
governments.” 181
This broad support appears to have weakend considerably in the wake of
the euro crisis, however. A 2013 Pew Research Center survey found that “[t]he
favorability of the EU has fallen from a median of 60% in 2012 to 45% in 2013,”
with particularly precipitous declines in France and Spain. 182 The same survey
found that “[t]he prolonged economic crisis has created centrifugal forces that are
pulling European public opinion apart, separating the French from the Germans
and the Germans from everyone else.” 183 It is far too early to say whether the
Lisbon TEU art. 4(2); see also id. art. 3 (providing that the EU “shall respect its rich cultural and
linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and
enhanced”). See generally Besselink, supra note 72, at 40-44 (discussing these provisions).
179
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impact of the euro crisis on public confidence will be enduring. But if “identity”
means, in William Mackenzie’s elegant phrase, “in what context do ‘I’ properly
use the word ‘we’?”, 184 then for most Europeans, “we” is not “Europe” or “the
EU.” 185
Identity plays a number of roles in federal systems. Some have argued that
a common sense of civic identity is necessary for democracy and community “will
formation.” 186 Europeans may also need a sense of common identity if they are to
be asked to make sacrifices on behalf of one another. 187 Germans are much more
likely to support financial aid to Greeks or Portuguese, for example, if they all feel
a common bond as “Europeans.” 188 It overlaps conceptually with loyalty; as I have
argued elsewhere, loyalty entails a sense of identity with the community that does
not depend on complete congruence between the community’s policies and one’s
own preferences. 189 In Albert Hirschman’s seminal analysis of responses to
dissatisfaction in communities, loyalty plays the critical role of retarding exit and
motivating voice. 190 It is often, in the short term, an irrational response; loyalty is
a refusal to exit even when doing so might favor one’s immediate interests. But
commitment to a community or an institution may bring benefits in the medium to
long term, especially if—as Professor Hirschman argues—a demonstration of
loyalty may enhance one’s voice within that community. 191
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In the United States, citizen identification with subnational units enhances
the likelihood that states will compete and innovate, 192 and it powers the “political
safeguards of federalism” by giving representatives in Washington, D.C., a reason
to care about and act to protect the prerogatives of state governments back
home. 193 In the EU, on the other hand, loyalty to “Europe” might cause citizens in
a particular Member State to oppose exit from the EU (or a watering-down of ties),
even when they disagree with policies adopted at EU level. (It is worth
remembering that in the EU, unlike America, the ultimate option of secession
remains on the table. 194)
To be sure, social identity is not necessarily a zero-sum game. Americans
tend to focus on episodes like Robert E. Lee’s tragic choice of his beloved
Virginia over his allegiance to the United States, which had actually offered him
command of the Union army at the outset of the Civil War. 195 We accordingly
worry that identity with one’s particular State will undermine one’s loyalty to the
nation. In so doing, however, we ignore another tradition in thinking about loyalty
exemplified by Edmund Burke’s notion that “[t]o be attached to the subdivision, to
love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle . . . of public
affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed toward a love to
our country and to mankind.” 196 A variety of contemporary observers agree that
most individuals hold multiple social identities at once. 197 Hence it is at least
possible, at Thomas Risse has observed, that “we can strongly identify with our
region, our nation-state, and feel loyalty toward the EU.” 198
The survey data bear out this possibility. Professor Risse finds that
“[a]lthough very few people exclusively identify with Europe or prioritize Europe
over their nation-state, 40 percent to 50 percent on average feel attached to their
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nation and then to Europe.” 199 Multiple identities may be particularly useful in
federal systems. Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist 28:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of
the state governments, and these will have the same disposition
towards the general government. The people, by throwing
themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If
their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as
the instrument of redress. 200
Hamilton described a kind of checks and balances of the heart, in which popular
loyalty is not ideally fixed, but fluid, shifting to one level of government or the
other in response to the behavior of each. Even if one’s loyalty to one level of
government may be stronger than to another, this dynamic can operate as long as
each level is a sufficiently plausible object of loyalty that, in the event of
misbehavior by the one, the other can mobilize the allegiance of a dissatisfied
populace. 201
The prospects for European identity depend on variables that are only
imperfectly understood. The American Founders did not talk about identity, but
they had a lot to say about loyalty. James Madison argued in Federalist 45 and 46
that citizens would prove loyal to the government that provided for their most
basic, every-day needs. 202 Likewise, contemporary political theorists have argued
that a political community may constitute itself by the activity of deliberating and
legislating as a community and observing a communal obligation to obey the
laws. 203 Similarly, European neofunctionalists predicted that citizens would come
to identify with the EU for pragmatic reasons as the EU increasingly took
responsibility for policies that benefited them. 204 As Thomas Risse has
demonstrated, public opinion data bears this prediction out—at least to some
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extent. 205 And identity with Europe seems to be stronger among elites than among
the people at large. 206
The content of a universal European identity is not easy to pin down. 207
Many invoke the EU’s 1993 Copenhagen criteria, which describe the EU “a s a
community of liberal democracies and market economies governed by the rule of
law and respecting human rights including minority rights.” 208 It is not obvious
how distinctive that formula is—the United States, after all, fits the same
description. But distinctiveness and identity are not the same thing; after all,
Tolstoy observed that all happy families are alike. 209 In any event, there are other
strands of pan-European identity formation that do not fit this modern, secular
liberal mode. The entry into the EU of the states of Central and Eastern Europe,
for example, has reinvigorated the notion of Christianity as a basic component of
European identity. 210
However, as Anthony Smith has observed, “national identifications possess
distinct advantages over the idea of a unified European identity. They are vivid,
accessible, well established, long popularized, and still widely believed, in broad
outline at least.” 211 Professor Smith concludes that, “[i]n each of these respects,
‘Europe’ is deficient both as idea and as process. Above all, it lacks a pre-modern
past—a ‘prehistory’ which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical
depth.” 212 Interestingly, the development of a European identity has responded to
this difficulty in different ways within different Member States. Many Germans,
for example, have come to view European identity in opposition to their own pre World War II past, and those memories of ethnic nationalism and Nazi atrocities
are certainly—to use Smith’s terms—“vivid, accessible, well established, long
popularized, and still widely believed.” 213 The French, on the other hand, have
tended to view Europe as an extension of their French identity—a “greater France”
that offers the only realistic option for maintaining France’s rightful place as a
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political leader and cultural beacon on the world stage. 214 And the Eastern
European states tend to see a “return to Europe” as a reaffirmation of an earlier
European identity suppressed under Soviet-imposed communism. 215 In all these
different ways, European identity can either build on or play off of more “vivid”
national identities.
These dynamics reflect a broader tendency described by Professor Risse,
which is that while there is little evidence of a robust “European” identity,
supported by a pan-European public sphere, we do see a progressive
“Europeanization” of national identities and national public spheres. 216 In other
words, people remain French, German, or Polish, and their debates continue to
take place within distinct national environments. But national identities
increasingly incorporate a European component, and public debates increasingly
concern European issues and engage participants from outside the national sphere.
From an intergovernmental perspective, that may be enough. In this model,
Member State governments need their publics to support the delegation of
important functions to the EU, but since the Member States remain the pr imary
actors it would seem fine—even salutary—that national identities remain primary.
The primacy of national identity, moreover, serves as a critical “political
safeguard” of member state autonomy in an intergovernmental scheme. As long as
member states remain the primary font of legitimate political authority, no cession
of policy authority to Brussels is likely to be irrevocable, and the truly salient
decisions will be dominated by the politics of the national capitals.
Those who prefer some version of “ever closer union,” on the other hand,
tend to see the europeanization of national identity as a hopeful sign that the
development of full-fledged European identity is possible. 217 Jurgen Habermas, for
example, argues that increasing labor immigration, growing ethnic, religious, and
linguistic diversity, as well as mass tourism and the Internet “have ren dered
national borders porous”; he looks hopefully toward the development of a
“Europe-wide civic solidarity” that would make meaningful democracy and
redistributive sacrifice possible at the EU level. 218 Nascent federalists thus press
for ever more public engagement with EU processes and issues. 219
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Intergovernmentalists like Professor Moravcsik, on the other hand, suggest that the
EU performs best when it flies under the radar; to the extent that democratic
publics pay attention to their supranational agents in Brussels, they are unlikely to
like what they find. 220
The conflict between an intergovernmental Europe with predominantly
national identity and a federal one of “Europe-wide civic solidiarity” is put most
starkly, of course, by the EU’s recent crises over the euro, migration, and
terrorism. Before turning to those crises, however, it will help to discuss the
longer-term relationship between federalism and time.
II.

The Future of European Integration: Of Federalism and Time

My goal in this essay is not to urge that either the federal or the
intergovernmental perspective is the right one. Both accurately describe elements
of the European legal and political order. It follows that it is perfectly
appropriate, for example, to compare the EU’s powers to those of a federal state —
so long as one remembers that those powers are also limited by factors not
common to federal states. In the remainder of this essay, I want to ask whether the
current post-Lisbon settlement is likely to be stable. Professor Moravcsik, for
example, argues that the EU now does basically the things that it makes sense for
the EU to do; that extension of EU authority into areas like social provision would
be both unworkable and unpopular; and that hence we are unlikely to see large scale changes in the absence of some sort of “exogenous shock.” 221 Other
observers, however, have argued that federal regimes are “inherently unstable.” 222
I will consider here two possible reasons to doubt the stability of current
arrangements. The first is what skeptics of national power in the United States
might call “creeping nationalism”—and proponents of European federalism might
call “ever closer union.” The idea is that federal systems may have some sort of
inherent tendency toward centralization over time. 223 American history appears at
first glance to provide some support for that notion. I will suggest, however, that
this American historical tendency may not necessarily be replicated in Europe,
mostly because of the different way in which the arc of centralization intersects
with the arc of the growth of government generally in the two different contexts.
The second possibility arises from the possibility that some exogenous
shock might upset the EU’s current equilibrium. In the United States, the growth
220
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of national power has often responded to various national crises. 224 And Europe
has recently experienced a series of crises, beginning with the Euro crisis and
continuing with turmoil over mass migrations and terrorist attacks. Each of these
crises has the potential to upset various aspects the EU’s equilibrium —and in
particular, each has placed pressure on the EU’s rough balance between federalism
and intergovernmentalism.
A.

“Ever Closer Union”?

The history of American federalism is one of unrelenting centralization.
Madison wrote in Federalist 45 that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined,” 225 but as Gary
Lawson has observed, “the best laid schemes o’ mice, men and framers gang aft a gley.” 226 From the establishment of the Bank of the United States, to the use of
national power to expand American territory and settle the frontier, and the
development of infrastructure necessary to prosecute the Civil War, to the
development of a regulatory infrastructure in the Progressive era and a welfare
bureaucracy under the New Deal and Great Society, as well as the expansion of the
federal judicial role of enforcing federal civil rights and the development of a
national security state, centralization of government power has proceeded in fits
and starts but has almost always run in the same direction. 227 Advocating
constitutional limits on national power, by contrast, has long been an essentially
rear-guard action, an effort to slow the growth of the national Leviathan rather
than to actually roll it back. 228 The Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in United
States v. Lopez 229 and United States v. Morrison, 230 for example, ended an era of
judicial abdication with respect to enforcing the limits of Congress’s enumerated
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powers, but the limits imposed in those and subsequent cases have not
meaningfully cut back on national regulatory authority. 231
American scholars either celebrate these developments or develop
something of a fatalistic streak. It is easy to draw the inference that, as a general
matter, federal systems have a tendency toward centralization of power. 232 And it
is equally easy to see evidence for that tendency in Europe. Certainly that was the
original plan: advocates of integration in the “neofunctionalist” school sought to
build constant centralizing pressure into the system. As Paul Craig as explained,
they hoped that “[i]f there was integration in one sphere it would, therefore, create
pressure for integration to proceed in other areas.” 233 For example, “[i]f formal
tariff barriers and quotas were removed with the object of facilitating the creation
of a single market, this would in turn generate a need to deal with non-tariff
barriers which could have an equally destructive impact on cross-border trade.
This very same desire to create a single market with a level playing field as
between the states would then lead to other matters being decided at Community
level.” 234 Likewise, neofunctionalists anticipated that “[i]n areas which had been
integrated the relevant interest groups would then be expected to concentrate their
attention on the Community level, consonant with the basic idea that ‘you sho ot
where the ducks are’ and apply pressure on those who have the regulatory
power.” 235 These same centralizing pressures have played a prominent role in
American federalism for some time.
Although leading contemporary scholars of European integration have
come to doubt important aspects of the neofunctionalist account, they
acknowledge that “functional spillover created and continues to create some
impetus for further integration.” 236 And students of European identity-formation
have concluded that those who have been most able to avail themselves of the
benefits of freedom of movement and the single market—typically, educated and
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mobile elites—are the most likely to identify primarily as “European” rather than
as citizens of a particular Member State. 237
Another factor driving centralization in European Law has been the
teleological approach often taken by the European Court of Justice. In cases
construing both the underlying treaties and the scope and effect of community
legislation, the ECJ has employed a “preference for Europe” that tends to
maximize the integrative effect of community law. 238 American jurisprudence
lacks any such frank acknowledgements of a driving teleology, but it is not hard to
find similar impetuses in our constitutional law. It seems f air to say, for example,
that the Marshall Court’s pathmarking federalism decisions 239 were driven by a
common imperative to carve out institutional space for the infant national
government.
Similar imperatives drove the expansive development of federal general
common law in the Nineteenth Century, 240 the post-Reconstruction expansion of
federal judicial power, 241 and the judge-driven incorporation of the Bill of Rights
into the Fourteenth Amendment 242 and the expansion of federal unenumerated
rights. 243 These developments were all “teleological” in the sense that a whole host
of discrete interpretive questions were resolved in line with a general imperative to
replace “parochial” state laws and courts with uniform national principles and
federal judicial enforcement. 244 The relevant questions concerned a wide array of
constitutional provisions, federal statutes, and common law doctrines, but there is
little doubt that many of the answers rested on an American version of “ever closer
union.”
The rationales for these American jurisprudential moves offer some insight
into the forces pressing for centralization in modern federal systems. The
237
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expansion of the general federal common law, especially in the nineteenth century,
reflected imperatives similar to the construction of Europe’s internal market. The
idea was that merchants and other commercial entities doing business across state
lines (and therefore having access to the federal courts) should have recourse to a
uniform set of commercial rules; that sort of uniformity, it was thought, would
encourage the growth of an integrated and prosperous national market. 245 The
extended sequence of statutes and cases establishing a broad scope and preferred
position for federal court jurisdiction, on the other hand, reflected a di strust of
state institutions after the Civil War. Whereas the Founding era had seen state
courts as the primary forums for resolution of legal disputes under both state and
federal law, 246 the late nineteenth and early twentieth century cases came to view
the federal courts as essential vehicles for bypassing state parochialism and
assuring the supremacy of federal law. 247 Finally, the human rights cases display a
strong dose of rights universalism; once a court defines a right as fundamental, it
is hard not to mandate that all jurisdictions conform. 248
These imperatives cash out somewhat differently in Europe. The drive for
uniform legal rules to govern commerce in the single market has seen remarkable
success, and as the neofunctionalists predicted the beneficiaries of this sort of
uniformity have been among the strongest supporters of European integration. In
contrast, European law generally has not sought to supplant or bypass Member
State institutions, choosing instead to use those institutions as the pr imary vehicles
for implementing and enforcing European law. 249 I have already discussed the role
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of Member State bureaucracies in enforcing European law, but this is also true on
the judicial side. There is no parallel EU judicial system like the American federal
judiciary, which includes the full array of administrative courts, trial courts of first
instance, regional courts of appeal, and a Supreme Court. 250 This institutional
reality has in turn affected the development of European human rights
jurisprudence. That jurisprudence has developed primarily in either national courts
or in the distinct forum of the European Court of Human Rights, which continues
to stand apart from the EU legal structure. 251
To put the point more directly, America’s national institutions benefit from
enormous prestige among the business community (as the suppliers and enforcers
of uniform rules ensuring a single national market) as well as the media and elite
intellectuals (who look to federal law and institutions for the progressi ve
regulation and social provision, as well as the development and enforcement of
individual rights). Both groups tend to see the centralization of national authority
as a response to a history of inaction or policy failures at the state level. 252 For
many in both groups, the States are annoying bastions of parochialism —
impediments to commerce and havens of backward thinking on race and other
issues. 253 This view persists—and provides an impetus for further centralization—
despite the demonstrable role of States at the forefront of many progressive
causes, from consumer safety regulation to same-sex marriage to environmental
protection. 254
But it is not necessarily this way in Europe. While the EU has established
itself as the protector of open and competitive markets, it has not also taken on the
supra note 41, at 2426 (noting how the ECJ was able to enlist national courts as allies in spurring
the enforcement of EU law).
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role as the guardian of constitutionalism and human rights. That function remains
primarily with the Member States. Jürgen Habermas thus insists that those states
“survive within the federal polity in their freedom-guaranteeing function of
constitutional states,” with the responsibility to ensure that “the Union must not
fall below the level of taming and civilizing state power already achieve d in the
states.” 255 So when the German Constitutional Court, as well as high tribunals in
other member states, asserts the right to limit integration in the name of
constitutional democracy, 256 it can draw on institutional and political resources
that no American state supreme court could assert.
A similar contrast is even more evident with respect to the institutions of
the regulatory and welfare state. Regulatory and welfare institutions developed in
the United States most prominently (although not exclusi vely) at the federal level,
in part because of perceived inaction by the States. Hence, Franklin Roosevelt’s
New Deal occurred at the national level due to widespread inability of state and
local governments to respond to the Depression; likewise, federal environmental
regulation in the 1970s responded to perceived neglect in most states. 257 In Europe,
by contrast, the Member States developed extensive regulatory and welfare
institutions long before the foundation of the EU. Hence, while the EU dominates
regulation providing for competition and open markets, Europeans look primarily
to their Member States for other forms of regulation and for education, welfare,
and other forms of social protection. 258 Part of the explanation is surely temporal.
Movements toward centralization in America occurred at roughly the same time as
(and partly as a result of) pressures to expand the role of government generally
and recognize a broader range of individual rights: the arcs of centralization and of
the growth of government largely coincided. In Europe, the movement toward
unification began well after much of the expansion of government generally had
already taken place.
Institutional inertia thus plays a profoundly different role in Europe and the
United States. Efforts to decentralize American government, such as Ronald
Reagan’s “New Federalism” in the 1980s, confront an entrenched federal
regulatory and welfare bureacracy in which millions of people have a stake. It is
small wonder that no serious effort to “roll back” these bureaucracies has ever
gotten off the ground. 259 In Europe, by contrast, the entrenched bureaucracies exist
255
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at the Member State level, and it is little surprise that EU governance must operate
through them, rather than as an alternative.
Similar, but more profound, temporal differences explain why Europeans
are likely to continue to identify primarily with their Member States for the
foreseeable future. Many of the Member States have been independent nations for
centuries, and although some—e.g., Italy, Germany—are considerably newer, they
nonetheless date from roughly the same period in which nationalism became a
major force in world affairs. 260 This was approximately the same time period in
which the United States transformed into a nation in the mod ern sense. 261 Most of
the American states have no history as independent political communities separate
from the United States, and the experience of those that do was generally brief and
unsatisfactory. 262 Notwithstanding the spectacular success of the EU over the past
half-century, these communal memories of nationhood will not yield easily.
The EU’s division of labor between Member States and Brussels seems
likely to reinforce this sense of identity, at least for the time being. The American
authors of the Federalist papers argued that federal systems involve a vertical
competition for the loyalties of the sovereign People, and that the advantage in this
competition would rest with the government entrusted with functions that mattered
to citizens in their everyday lives. 263 Hence, the primacy of national identification
in America has coincided with a shift in responsibility over bread -and-butter
regulation (e.g., consumer safety, employee rights) and, most important, social
provision from the states to the national government. In Europe, those functions
remain with the Member States—a role solidified by the temporal development of
their welfare states prior to the advent of the EU. As Professor Moravcsik points
out, despite the volume of law emanating from Brussels most of it deals with
matters of relatively low salience to private citizens. 264
All of these points should counsel caution in assuming that Europe will see
the same inexorable march toward centralization that we observe in American
history. It is true that the scope of EU competences is already extremely broad,
and it seems to expand with each new treaty. But it would be impossible to
capitalize on that breadth without significantly increasing the governmental
capacity of the Union, in terms not only of its fiscal and administrative resources
but also of its ability to take truly autonomous decisions. And that sort of shift
seems unlikely without any shift in citizens’ primary identification tow ard the
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Union. The same factors of inertia and tradition that impede any serious rollback
of federal power in the United States press against each expansion of institutional
power in Brussels.
B.

Shocks to the System: The Euro and Other Crises

Professor Moravcsik has argued that the EU’s current “constitutional
settlement” is likely to be stable, “barring large exogenous shocks.” 265 It is
possible, however, that the Euro Crisis is that shock—or at least that it indicates
the sort of disruptive factors that might undermine the current equilibrium. That
crisis has revealed a disconnect between the Euro-zone’s centralized monetary
policy and its decentralized fiscal policy: Member States within the zone share a
common currency, but they make their own taxing, spending, and borrowing
decisions. 266 For some time, analysts have disagreed vigorously as to whether this
disconnect is sustainable over the long term. 267 As the crisis has played out, the
states of the Euro area have taken measures to strengthen central controls over
Member States’ fiscal policy in order to preserve the Euro’s monetary union. 268
The jury remains out as to whether the euro crisis will ultimately deepen the
institutional basis of EMU or cause that monetary union to collapse ; there is little
doubt, however, that the crisis has already profoundly affected the EU’s
institutional structure. 269
Likewise, 2015 saw the EU reeling under two additional and related crises.
An “unprecedented” number of refugees from Syria, Libya, Iraq, sub -Saharan
Africa, and other places flooded into Europe in 2015, “more than in any previous
European refugee crisis since World War II.” 270 Through the first nine months of
the year, over 800,000 people claimed asylum in the EU. 271 The influx impacted
some Member States considerably more than others, and individual states varied
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widely in their willingness to accept the migrants. 272 Immigration was already a
sensitive issue in Europe, with right-leaning anti-immigration policies making
remarkable gains in recent years. It is thus unsurprising that the refugee crisis has
produced vocal disagreements both within and among the EU’s Member States, or
that the EU’s central instituions have commenced legal action to enforce various
Member States’ obligations in relation to the influx. 273
Responding to the migrant crisis became considerably more difficult in
November, when Islamic terrorists killed 130 people in Paris. 274 Unsurprisingly,
the attacks seemed to spur opposition across Europe to accepting more migrants ,
especially in light of concerns that some potential terrorists may be among the
many thousands of Middle Eastern refugees. 275 Moreover, the terrorist threat has
brought pressure to revisit the Schengen Agreement, which abolished border
controls among twenty-six European countries. 276 Reinstituting permanent border
controls, of course, would be a highly-visible marker making Europe more like an
intergovernmental federation and less like a federal state.
I focus on the Euro crisis here, because it has been going on for longer and
its effects on the EU’s federal balance are thus somewhat easier to discern. But all
272
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three crises share one similar dynamic, which is that the EU has tended to respond
intergovernmentally, with the discussion dominated by the most powerful member
states—particularly Germany and France. The Euro area’s effort to impose
considerably stronger constraints on Member State fiscal policy, for example,
paradoxically centralizes control over a critical area of governance while, at the
same time, circumventing the EU’s central political institutions in important ways.
Likewise, national leaders have played the key roles on migration and terrorism.
Although crises have tended to play a centralizing role in American federalism,
they may also disrupt central institutions if those institutions are unable to lead the
governmental response.
1.

Fiscal Federalism and Member State Sovereignty

The Euro Crisis arose in part out of asymmetries between the various
Member State economies in the euro area. Various aspects of the world financial
crisis impacted different Member States differently. 277 Because of their
commitment to EMU, individual Member States like Greece lacked the ability to
respond through monetary policy—a devaluation of the drachma, for example. 278
They thus faced an increased risk of default on their debt, which gave rise to fears
of contagion in other European Member States. That risk, and accompanying urges
to bail out the most severeley affected States, put profound pressure on Europe’s
system of fiscal federalism.
The literature on fiscal federalism suggests that there are basically two
ways to organize the financial relationship between a central government and its
subunits. 279 In most federal systems, the center guarantees the debts of the
subunits. 280 These guarantees create a potential for moral hazard; subunits may
spend and borrow willy nilly (and creditors will be willing to lend to them),
knowing that the central government will make good their debts. In order to avoid
that problem, most central governments retain control over fiscal policy by
constraining the taxing, spending, and borrowing authority of subnational
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governments. 281 The alternative viable arrangement is for the subunits to retain
fiscal sovereignty over taxing, spending, and borrowing, while the central
government ensures that the credit markets will discipline them by committing not
to bail the subunits out in the event of a default. 282 The trick, of course, is in
making the no-bailout commitment credible. Where that effort succeeds, the costs
of borrowing for each subunit—reflected in the interest rates it must pay on the
bonds it issues—will vary according to the creditworthiness of each subnational
government. 283
The United States has generally pursued the latter arrangement. Federal
law imposes no general constraints on state taxing, spending, or borrowing. The
national government has, however, generally refused to bail out state governments
when all that autonomy gets them into trouble. 284 Eight states defaulted in the
1840s, ten more in the late nineteenth century following Reconstruction, and
Arkansas defaulted during the Depression. 285 Hence when Charles Dickens
referred to the worthlessness of “a United States security,” he actually meant a
bond issued by one of the American state governments that defaulted in the wake
of the Panic of 1837. 286 Although there have been efforts to get the national
government to intervene in each instance, those efforts have generally been
unsuccessful. 287 The current significant differences among bond yields and credit
ratings for the various American states strongly suggests that the financial markets
continue to perceive the national government’s “no bailout” commitment as highly
credible. 288
Germany—the leading federal system within the EU—has chosen a mixed
model; the central government controls taxation by the Lander but not
281
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expenditures or borrowing, and bailouts are available but not automatic. 289
Because of the strong bailout expectation, the credit ratings of the various Lander
do not vary according to actual creditworthiness of the particular Lander
governments. 290 But the EU itself purports to follow the American model of fiscal
federalism. The Member States do their own taxing, spending, and borrowing, and
Brussels does not formally guarantee their debts. Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon
incorporated an explicit “no bailout” clause. 291 Prior to the Euro crisis, the Union
did impose some fiscal constraints on the Euro-zone countries in the form of the
“Stability and Growth Pact,” but those constraints quickly lost most of their
credibility when the Union failed to enforce them after French and German
violations of the Pact’s deficit limits. 292 Nonetheless, financial markets appear to
have treated the various Member States’ debts as if they were part of a fiscallyunitary federation. 293
Nothing in these fiscal or monetary arrangements can be said to have
caused the Euro crisis. The trouble was that the various Euro-zone countries
varied considerably in their vulnerability to the worldwide financial crisis that
began in 2007, and the EU lacked the central stabilization mechanisms available to
more centralized states. 294 In particular, countries like Greece, Portugal, and
Ireland—which generally had less competitive economies and more profli gate
public sectors—suddenly found themselves in danger of defaulting on their debts.
What the euro arrangement did do was to call the EU’s no bailout commitment
into question, 295 because an actual debt default by a Euro-zone country would put
pressure on that Member State to exit the Euro so as to regain the monetary tools
to respond to the crisis. Moreover, the integration of the Euro -zone economies
meant that much of the Greek debt, as well as debt issued by other struggling
Member States, was held by banks in Germany and other powerful EU
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countries. 296 Under the circumstances, it is not altogether surprising that the nobailout pledge went by the boards. 297
It is not obvious, in fact, whether the U.S. model of fiscal federalism,
predicated on a credible no-bailout commitment, is viable in a modern economy
with extensive and highly-integrated governmental establishments. 298 During the
financial crisis of 2008-09, the United States government bailed out multiple large
private actors, including major banks, insurance companies, and automobile
manufacturers—on the ground that their collapse would cause catastrophic
systemic damage to the American economy. 299 It is hard to believe that a default
by, say, California or Illinois would not cause comparable risks. 300 Indeed, the
U.S. territory of Puerto Rico is teetering toward default as this chapter goes to
press, and prominent voices are already arguing that “Puerto Rico is ‘too big to
fail.’” 301
Two related aspects of modern “cooperative federalism” further increase
the likelihood that the national government would consider any American state
“too big to fail.” The first is that, because most cooperative federalism programs
involve a combination of federal and state spending on some sort of “matching”
formula, much state spending is driven by federal spending choices. It might
accordingly seem unfair not to bail out a state government whose profligacy was
296
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in part dictated by decisions made in Washington, D.C. 302 The second, converse
point is that because the federal government typically depends on state officials to
implement many of its regulatory and benefit schemes, the federal government
simply cannot allow those state governments to collapse or even seriously cut back
on their governmental capacity. 303 State creditors appear to nonetheless assume
that no rescue would be forthcoming in the event of a state default, but it is no
longer clear that that assumption is warranted.
The same factors undermining the likelihood that the United States would
refuse to bail out a state government seem fully applicable—if not more
applicable—to Europe. Given that the European law currently leaves social
provision largely to the Member States, it may be that a smaller percentage of
Member State spending is driven by EU requirements than in the United States.
But the EU is almost completely dependent on the Member States for enforcement
of the regulatory law that Brussels does produce. If any Member State found itself
in an existential financial crisis, a severe contraction in its governmental capacity
might well undermine implementation of European law to a degree unacceptable
either to Brussels or to the Member States. 304 To be sure, EMU adds another layer
of interdependence. But it may be that the EU has not had to confront the
possibility of bailing out a non-Eurozone state simply because those states have
tended to be in better fiscal shape of late—not because the non-Euro-zone is
insufficiently integrated to raise similar systemic risks if such a state should get
into trouble.
If the fiscal autonomy/no-bailout model is on the wane, then the EU will
need to consider exercising greater control over Member States’ fiscal policy in
order to avoid the moral hazard problem. This would not necessarily require the
EU to assume broad powers over taxing and spending. As Alicia Hinarejos points
out, the EU would have a choice between a “‘surveillance model’, where Member
States coninue to maintain all taxing power and where the EU has a corrective role
as an enforcer of discipline,” and a “‘classic fiscal federalism model’, where the
EU acquires taxing power and its own independent sphere of fiscal authority, and
thus its own fiscal tools for macroeconomic stabilization.” 305 The recent “Fiscal
Compact,” 306 concluded among the Eurozone members in 2012, fits into the
surveillance model. Its primary innovation is to require the signatory states “to
enact the so-called ‘golden rule’—a requirement that annual government budgets
302
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be balanced—in Member State constitutions.” 307 This requirement is to be
enforced not only by conditioning financial assistance under the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM), but also through a judicial enforcement provision
under which any other party to the Compact may bring a state’s noncompliance
before the ECJ. 308
In one sense, the Fiscal Compact brings European fiscal federalism closer
to the American model. After all, almost all of the American states have balanced
budget requirements, and those requirements (with some allowance for creative
bookkeeping) are generally observed. 309 But America’s “golden rules” were
adopted autonomously by the States; they remain entirely creatures of state law,
and there are no federal constraints on state budgeting analogous to the Fiscal
Compact. 310 It seems unlikely, moreover, that any federal court would ever be
willing to enforce compliance with a State’s balanced budget rule. 311 The result,
as Federico Fabbrini has observed, is a “paradox”: “[W]hile EU member states
have willingly refused to embrace a U.S.-like federal model for the governance of
the Euro-zone on the assumption that this was too restrictive of state sovereignty,
they have established a regime which is much less respectful of state fiscal
sovereignty than the U.S. one.” 312
The Fiscal Compact thus illustrates Alicia Hinarejos’s point that the
surveillance model, although adopted as a less intrusive option than a wholesale
shift of fiscal powers to the EU, may be “just as problematic from the point of
view of democratic legitimacy, and as threatening to national autonomy,” as the
classic fiscal federalism model. 313 If EU surveillance of Member State budgets
relies primarily on “soft law,” as it did under the Stability and Growth Pact, then it
is likely to prove toothless. The Fiscal Compact ratchets up both the specificity of
the budgetary requirements and the enforcement mechanisms, but it does not yet
require specific taxing and spending policies to meet the Compact’s fiscal targets.
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Some observers, however, believe that this may be the next step if the present
Compact fails to ensure fiscal discipline. 314
In any event, even the current level of control seems problematic from a
democratic perspective. As the often-messy American debates over the last year
concerning the national debt ceiling, spending cuts, and other financial measures
make clear, 315 fiscal questions lie at the heart of contemporary democratic politics.
Moreover, debt assistance to Greece and other Member States h as come attached
to draconian austerity conditions that both critically undermine each State’s
autonomy and also engender significant hostility to European institutions. Daniel
Ziblatt argues that these arrangements are not simply a more centralized form of
federalism, but rather a form of direct rule by European actors like the ECB. 316
These developments have led Fritz Scharpf to conclude that “[a]s long as the
present euro regime continues, democracy has no chance in Europe.” 317
Recent litigation in Germany has moved these democratic concerns into the
courts. The German Federal Constitutional Court has interpreted the German Basic
Law to require national parliamentary control of basic governmental decisions,
including basic fiscal powers. 318 In the Gauweiler litigation, the GFCC challenged
the European Central Bank’s “Outright Monetary Transactions” program (OMT),
under which the ECB sought to resolve the various Member State debt crises by
promising to buy an unlimited amount of government-issued bonds in the
secondary market. The GFCC declined to enjoin the OMT program and referred
the case to the ECJ, but it strongly suggested that if construed broadly, the OMT
program would violate the ECB’s mandate under the European treaties and
possibly the German Basic Law’s requirements for democratic decisionmaking as
well. 319 When the ECJ ruled on the Gauweiler reference in June of 2015, however,
it upheld the OMT program’s validity. 320 Although the ECJ did require that
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safeguards be built into any exercise of the OMT authority, “these safeguards are
not new or especially onerous, and they do not go as far as the ones put forward by
the German Federal Constitutional Court as conditions of legality. ” 321 Although
the ECJ’s decision may well end jockeying over the OMT program—which has
not, in fact, yet been implemented—it seems unlikely to resolve broader concerns
about the legality or legitimacy of the Euro area’s response to the crisis.
More broadly, the Euro area—and the EU generally—faces difficult choices
concerning whether to further combine economic prerogatives in order to shape a
more unified economic policy, or whether to try to stabilize the system on an
intergovernmental basis. As early as 1999, Francis Snyder argued that “[t]he
debate about EMU . . . is a debate about the future of the EU as a polity, the
European social model, and the nature of European identity.” 322 The GFCC’s more
recent disquiet about efforts to maintain the EMU is a signal that the Euro crisis
has brought the EU to the limits of its intergovernmental model. 323 Hence, as Jean
Pisani-Ferry has observed, “beyond the immediate macroeconomic and financial
urgencies, the euro area is confronted with deeper choices about the type of
economy it wants and the degree to which it is willing to accept the political
consequences of its economic choices.” 324
2.

Variable Geometry and Intergovernmentalism

A further complication arises from the EU’s “variable geometry” —that is,
the frequently asymmetrical character of its federalism. Only nineteen of the EU’s
twenty-eight members currently use the Euro, although several more are seeking to
meet the euro zone’s eligibility critiera. 325 Several non-Eurozone countries signed
the Fiscal Compact, reflecting the degree of fiscal interdependence in Europe even
apart from the Euro. But the United Kingdom, Croatia, and the Czech Republic are
prohibition in the EU treaties. See generally Alica Hinarejos, Saving the Single Currency?
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not signatories. 326 Moreover, the Euro zone has imposed different—and often quite
draconian—policies on particular Member States as a condition of collective
assistance. 327 The Euro crisis and its accompanying fiscal reform thus implicate
different groups of countries and to varying degrees. And they have been adopted
and implemented through channels apart from the EU’s political institutions. It has
always been unclear whether and to what extent variable geometry threatens the
cohesion and stability of the European legal order. To the extent that the EU
fundamentally reshapes its model of fiscal federalism in ways that leave out
significant players, sideline established institutions, and impose asymmetrical and
unpopular burdens, those tensions are only likely to increase. 328
The EU’s “variable geometry” is not inherently antithetical to a federal
regime. 329 Canada has long survived with special accommodations for
Francophone Quebec, and even the United States has tolerated certain asymmetries
among the states, such as the special autonomy granted to California to set
demanding air pollution standards. 330 In some circumstances, the Europe a la carte
approach may defuse otherwise intractable political conflicts among the Member
States.
The politics of the Euro crisis, however, have exposed an important
possible weakness in the EU’s variable approach. Because key Member States
remain outside the Euro, the crisis has been handled intergovernmentally, outside
“the complex institutional system designed since the Treaty of R ome, in which
multiple checks and balances made sure that no group of states, or citizens, could
systematically dominate over the others in the decision-making process.” 331
Federico Fabbrini thus argues that this intergovernmental approach has given free
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rein to political and economic power imbalances among the Member States, with
the result that Germany “has taken over as the hegemonic player.” 332 This
tendency highlights not only the dangers of variable geometry but also the
“paradox” that, although intergovernmentalism is traditionally viewed as a
guarantee of state equality, it may under the right circumstances press in the
opposite directions.
The American states likewise differ significantly in size, prosperity, and
political clout. It may thus be of interest to think about why one rarely hears
analogous complaints that a single state—or even a coalition of large ones—is
dominating American politics. 333 This is no doubt partly attributable to the greater
number of players (50 rather than 28) and the somewhat smaller percentages of
population and economic output that the largest American states represent. 334 But
the numbers are not radically different. The more important difference may stem
from the concentration of government capacity at the center in the U.S. f ederalist
system, as compared to the EU’s intergovernmental maintenance of primary
budgetary and bureaucratic competences at the Member State level.
Because of the predominance of national governance in the United States,
even very large states have a hard time exerting power directly on the national
stage; state power, instead, tends to flow from a state’s ability to influence the
national government itself. 335 And while the structure of Congress does build in
greater representation for large states, the more important struggle is often for
332
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control of the Presidency and, with it, control of the national bureaucracy. That
contest is, of course, a matter of competition between two national political
parties; to the extent that states derive power from this competition, that power
tends to flow to the swing states that determine the outcome of presidential
elections. None of the three largest states (by population and economic output) —
California, Texas, and New York—is a swing state, and thus these states are
largely ignored in presidential campaigns (except for the not -inconsequential
function of fundraising). The dynamic of swing state power—conferring leverage
on the next tier of states, such as Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia —thus
cuts against the clout of the largest states. 336 And the organization of the
Congress—especially its reliance on powerful committees often run by seniority—
creates yet another power dynamic that may confer disproportionate leverage on
small states like West Virginia or Wisconsin. 337
All of this tends to confirm Professor Fabbrini’s point that
intergovernmentalism is not always good for state equality, because when states
interact as states, the power disparities between them will often prove influential.
In America, the constitutional separation of powers at the national level tends to
check and balance the power that any given state can exercise over national
policy. 338 Likewise, as Fabbrini points out, the EU’s complex institutional
architecture tends, when the EU acts supranationally, to dilute power disparities
among the Member States. 339 But if crises prompt Europeans to look first to their
Member States, which then cooperate on an intergovernmental basis, these power
dispoarities will tell upon the results.
The broader trouble with variable geometry, however, is that as the Euro
(or Schengen) areas become more economically and legally distinct from the rest
of the EU, they will come to need more fully developed governments of their
own. 340 The closest American analog to variable geometry—the interstate
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compact—is typically limited to matters of an extremely narrow scope. 341 EMU
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Schengen create significant divergences in
interests and imperatives with respect to monetary and fiscal policy and border
security, respectively. In effect, part of the EU has chosen a more centralized
model for these issues, while the remainder has chosen to stick with an
intergovernmental approach. 342 But the “closer union” of the euro and Schengen
areas has relied primarily on freestanding rules or ad hoc international agreements
without creating actual governing institutions. It is not at all clear whether this
uneasy compromise can withstand the pressures generated by the euro, migration,
and terror crises of recent years. As Jean Pisani-Ferry has pointed out,
“[g]overnance by rules and procedures can work fine in fair-weather conditions,
but it cannot be relied on in stormy weather.” 343
Conclusion
Jean Monnet said that Europe “would be forged in crises, and would be the
sum of the solutions to these crises.” 344 As this essay goes to press, all three of the
crises considered here—concerning the euro, migration and refugees, and
terrorism—continue to play out in real time. 345 These crises raise basic questions
of constitutional structure, whether or not Europeans are ready to look past the
daily headlines and confront them as such. In each case, the EU’s uneasy
compromise between federalism and intergovernmentalism may impede a stable
solution—or the need for a solution may undermine that compromise, prompting a
sharp move toward one or the other model.
Any firm prediction about ultimate outcomes for these crises deserves to be
met with healthy skepticism. As Christian Joerges has written, “the development
of an ever closer and then ever more democratic Europe can no longer be taken for
granted.” 346 It is worth remembering, however, that “predictions of the EU’s
demise are not new.” 347 Neither are warnings of impending consolidation. So far,
both the federal and intergovernmental elements of the EU’s architecture have
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proven quite enduring. As Europe moves forward, the experience of other federal
systems will continue to provide valuable lessons—and cautionary tales. The
growing awareness of European federalism among American public lawyers has
enriched debates within the United States simply by reminding us that many things
we take for granted—e.g., a federal system’s need for a common foreign policy
and a single supreme tribunal—are not eternal verities but simply contingent
characteristics of our own system. Hopefully certain aspects of the American
experience—such as the indeterminacy of textual limits on enumerated central
power, or the potential of “private attorneys general” to offset constraints on the
central government’s enforcement resources—will be similarly useful in Europe.
As these examples suggest, comparative experience is more likely to
undermine longstanding assumptions than to provide off-the-shelf answers to
common problems. The present circumstances and historical arcs of Europe and
America are simply too different to import concepts and policies from one context
to the other. But if, as Socrates suggested, the wise man knows what he does not
know, 348 then comparative law may be a path to wisdom. As I hope to have
demonstrated here, the real value of comparative work resides not in the answers it
provides but in the questions it provokes.
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